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Political thinkers have long asked whether freedom might be self-undermining, 
tending to erode the liberal rights and democratic politics that form its foundations. 1 
Anxious liberals like John Stuart Mill and meliorist conservatives like Alexis de 
Tocqueville worried that democracy threatened to swamp freedom under the “tyranny of 
the majority” or “democratic despotism.”2 These grim warnings carried very old political 
arguments into the democratic era.  Thinkers as eminent and diverse as Plato and the 
English monarchist Robert Filmer (John Locke’s target in the Two Treatises on 
Government) has argued that a society dedicated to personal freedom and collective self-
government would degenerate into personal self-indulgence and political mob rule.3
After the liberal and democratic revolutions in France, the United States, and elsewhere, 
radicals on both the left and the right took up the same arguments.  Arch-reactionary 
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1 Throughout this article, I use “liberal” to refer to a commitment to autonomy-protecting personal rights as 
a basic normative principle of political and legal order.  I use “democratic” to refer to a commitment both 
to majoritarian government through elections and, more broadly, the idea that the collective self-
government of political communities is a basic normative principle of political and legal order.   
2 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 690-95 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) (1850) (describing a despotism of innumerable small forms of 
interference with personal liberty); id. at 246-61 (describing “the tyranny of the majority,” a more direct 
application of power by a regnant majority over a vulnerable minority); JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY 71-74 (Geraint Williams, ed., Everyman, 1993) (1859) (describing evolution of the idea of the 
tyranny of the majority from the simple version of electoral domination to the more complex idea the subtle 
limitation on the freedom and judgment of each by the opinions as well as the political power of all). 
3 See ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA 2 (identifying the wish for self-government with original sin) 
28-29 (summarizing a long history of attacks on the character of democracies as violent, unstable, and 
tending to elevate selfish and sadistic leaders over nobler characters) (Johann Somerville ed., Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) (1680); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 240-43 (Book VIII) (Allan Bloom ed. & trans., 
U. Chicago Press, 1991) (examining the argument that unbalanced devotion to personal freedom and 
relativism among desires and opinions undermine liberty and self-government, so that “[t]oo much freedom 
seems to change into nothing but too much slavery, both for private man and city” and “tyranny is probably 
established out of no other regime than democracy … the greatest and most savage slavery out of the 
extreme of freedom,” id. at 242). 
2Joseph de Maistre proclaimed that the French Revolution’s defiance of established 
authority would bring anarchy and drown Europe in seas of blood.4 The leftists of the 
Frankfort School argued that the liberal doctrine of personal autonomy found its 
perfection in the cruel nihilism of the Marquis de Sade and Friedrich Nietzsche.5 The 
twentieth century produced a new genre of anxious liberal.  European fascism and post-
colonial nationalism both suggested that free men and women would flock to doctrines 
that made them unfree: promises of ethnic unity, moral clarity, and impeccable 
authority.6 The same question has re-emerged in Iraq, where political chaos implies that 
no democratic center can hold, and across the Arab world, where pessimists predict that 
democracy would mean the end of already scant liberal rights and, in time, of elections as 
well.7
As is often true when a lawyer addresses a question formulated by political 
theorists, I suspect there is no universal answer to the question of whether freedom is 
self-undermining.  Instead, the answer is the sum of the answers to many particular 
 
4 For an introduction to de Maistre’s thought, see ISAIAH BERLIN, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of 
Fascism, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 91-
174 (Henry Hardy, ed.) (1991).  Particularly vivid examples of de Maistre’s worldview, in which human 
existence is soaked in blood and all violence and suffering are punishment for the sin of an inherent 
debased human nature, appear at 111, 117, and 163. 
5 See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 81-119 
(trans. John Cumming) (1972). 
6 One can find versions of this anxiety on left and right alike.  See, e.g., ASHIS NANDY, THE 
ILLEGITMACY OF NATIONALISM: RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND THE POLITICS OF SELF 
89-90 (1994) (discussing the recapitulation of colonial violence and submission in the politics of post-
independence nationalism); V.S. NAIPAUL, AMONG THE BELIEVER 261, 297-305 (1981) (describing 
the development of a popular Islamic political identity in newly self-governing countries as pathological 
and violent); FOUAD AJAMI, THE DREAM PALACE OF THE ARABS 233 and passim (1998) 
(describing the rise of nationalism in post-colonial Arab politics as destructive of customs of tolerance and 
pluralism). 
7 See, e.g., James Glanz, A Little Democracy or a Genie Unbottled?, N.Y. TIMES X1 [Week in Review], 
Jan. 29, 2006 (discussing the victory of the Islamist party Hamas in Palestinian elections and asking 
whether political self-government is consistent with either liberty or order in illiberal settings).  The major 
recent statement of this concern is FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD (2003) (arguing that transitions from non-democratic to 
democratic rule are hazardous to liberal freedoms unless independent institutions have emerged to protect 
such freedoms, including civil society, reliable laws and courts, and orderly economic structures).  
3questions: whether and when popular elections undermine liberal rights, how free 
markets enhance or undermine democracy, and so forth.  In this article, I address a 
neglected part of the problem in a central area of contemporary freedom: reproductive 
autonomy.  I ask whether reproductive autonomy can undermine the political conditions 
that sustain it: a political and legal culture committed to individual rights and, even more 
basically, the stability of the political order across generations.8 The reason to fear that 
reproductive freedom might be self-undermining is based in two demographic crises.  In 
the world’s richest countries, particularly in Europe and Northeast Asia, fertility rates – 
the number of children the average woman will bear in her lifetime – have fallen well 
below the level needed to replace existing population.9 Meanwhile, in the largest and 
more important developing countries, India and China, young men outnumber young 
women by scores of millions, and the gap between the sexes is growing.10 
Each trend is the aggregate result of hundreds of millions of increasingly 
autonomous reproductive decisions.11 Fertility rates are below replacement level where 
 
8 By “even more basically,” I mean simply that all political liberties depend on the viability of the political 
order that enforces them. 
9 See, e.g., Europe’s Population Implosion, THE ECONOMIST (July 19, 2003).  I discuss this trend and 
present sources in I.A.1, below. 
10 See, e.g., VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 58-59 (2004).  I discuss this 
trend and present sources in I.A.2, below. 
11 The discussion of the previous two paragraphs, invoking changes in technology, social structure, law, 
and culture (or, if one prefers, personal preferences), imply something I should now make explicit.  When I 
refer to “reproductive autonomy,” I do not mean exclusively or even primarily the legally protected access 
to abortion and/or contraception that United States commentators tend to designate by the term.  I am 
deliberately referring to the whole suite of factors make women and families inclined and able to exercise 
self-conscious agency in whether and when to bear children.  In expanding the term I am not trying to make 
any normative point about the desirability or adequacy of uses of the term that focuses on legal protections 
(although as it happens I have conventional liberal views about the rights of contraception and abortion).  I 
intend the term analytically, to describe autonomy in the substantive sense of the measure of control 
women and families can and do exercise over reproduction, as distinct from a focus exclusively on what 
they are legally permitted to do.  As will become evident, my discussions of freedom and autonomy 
throughout this article use a substantive rather than a legally formal sense of these terms, not because I 
reject the formal version but because I find the substantive versions helpful in a productive engagement 
with the questions that drive the article.   
4legal, economic, and social equality between the sexes and increasingly individualistic 
values lead people to choose careers and non-traditional intimate relationships over 
childrearing, and legal contraception and abortion enable them to enforce those choices.12 
Asia’s sex disproportion comes from parents’ growing technological power to select their 
children’s sex through pre-natal testing and abortions of female fetuses, a preference that 
arises from both cultural attitudes and economic incentives.13 
Both trends also have serious consequences for political order.  Sub-replacement 
fertility threatens to cripple public pension systems by burdening shrinking numbers of 
working adults with the support of growing numbers of retirees.14 The one sure way to 
avoid this result, liberalizing immigration laws to let foreign-born workers replace never-
born native workers, would be such a goad to xenophobic and nationalist politics that 
 
12 See, e.g., Johan Surkyn & Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition 
in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe: An Update, DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH Special 
Collection 3, at 62-75 (April 17, 2004).  I develop this dimension of the argument throughout the article. 
 
13 The knottiest part of my formulation is the characterization of sex-selective abortion as an expression of 
autonomy in China, where reproductive decisions re taken under the pressure of the state’s notorious 
population-control policies.  For an introduction to the policy backdrop of this problem, see SUSAN 
GREENHALGH & EDWIN A. WINCKLER, GOVERNING CHINA’S POPULATION: FROM 
LENINIST TO NEOLIBERAL BIOPOLITICS 19-44 (describing the interaction of demographics and 
political power in China), 166-201 (presenting relevant policy developments under the present Hu 
government).  It would have been possible to avoid this problem by simply cordoning off China from my 
discussion: India, Taiwan, and other Asian countries have sufficiently dramatic sex ratios that China is not 
an analytically necessary part of the story.  I have chosen to include it for several reasons.  First, it is in 
many respects, including differential cultural valuation of sons and daughters and the respective economic 
incentives to bear boys and girls, the same story as in non-authoritarian regimes.  Second, the sense in 
which I am using “freedom” or “autonomy” is not restricted to legal permission to act, but includes the 
broader set of determinants of what one is in fact able to do with oneself and one’s life, which human 
potential one is able to realize in action.  In this respect, the availability of the same sex-selection-enabling 
technologies in China as in India and elsewhere is an increase in autonomy, and the effect of that increase 
under relevant constraints is precisely what interests me.  I draw this way of thinking about freedom from 
the work of Amartya Sen, which I briefly discuss in Part V, below.  Third, while political authoritarianism 
is a distinctive kind of evil, and I make no apologies for it, it is my argument that reproductive decisions are 
made under a variety of constraints, some subtler than others, which interact with political freedom or 
repression in influencing the consequences of reproductive choice for demographics.  Thus I am interested 
in all the constraints that bear on reproductive decisions, and on ways to overcome or mitigate them – not 
just in the decisions people make under “optimally free” or even approximately free circucmstances.  
14 See, e.g.., Europe’s Population Implosion, supra n. 9.  I discuss this phenomenon much more fully in 
I.A.1 and IV, below. 
5most observers regard it as politically impossible.15 Moreover, declining population 
historically inspires reactionary politics, with particular hostility toward women’s 
autonomy, in settings as diverse as Augustan Rome and eighteenth-century France.16 The 
other trend, disproportionately male populations – which implies large numbers of 
unmarried young men – is historically associated with growth in armies, military 
adventurism, and organized crime and social disorder.  These, in turn, are allied with 
authoritarian and illiberal politics.17 Today the problem is likely worse: unmarried and 
young men are the engines of nationalist and fundamentalist politics, which poses a threat 
to liberal and democratic prospects in the places where sex disproportion is most 
pronounced.18 In both cases, then, individual autonomy has systemic consequences that 
threaten to undermine the very features of political order that sustain autonomy.19 This is 
a troubling miniature of the timeless pessimistic argument that freedom in general is self-
undermining. 
 
15 See, e.g., Jonathan Grant et al., LOW FERTILITY AND POPULATION AGING 135 (report of the 
Rand Corporation, Europe) (available at http:/www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG206/ (last visited Nov. 
20, 2005) (“The sheer numbers of immigrants that are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU 
and its Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in Europe”).  I 
address this issue further in I.A.1, below. 
16 See CAROL BLUM, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: POPULATION, REPRODUCTION, AND POWER 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 1-4 (2002); TIM G. PARKIN, DEMOGRAPHY AND ROMAN 
SOCIETY 111-21 (1992) (outlining this perception, the evidence bearing on it, and the legal response). 
17 I present this argument in full at II.C, below. 
18 See id. 
19 Having laid out the general shape of my argument, I owe the reader a word on why I say virtually 
nothing about the United States in an article aimed primarily at an American legal audience.  The United 
States displays none of the trends I discuss here in any neat form.  The country’s overall fertility rate is ever 
so slightly below the replacement rate, but the population continues to expand because of rapid 
immigration that has been relatively uneventful politically.  See WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, 
supra n. __ at 71.  For the time being, that is, modestly more traditional family practices than Europe’s, 
combined with a significantly greater openness to immigration, seem to have enabled the United States to 
dodge the demographic bullet.  American readers should nonetheless be interested in the argument here for 
several reasons: the future of the United State depends on the future of the rest of the world; neither our 
openness nor our relative fertility is irreversible; and, more optimistically, something like the American 
openness to immigration may be part of an optimistic medium-term to long-term scenario for third-
generation biopolitics.  I resist simply prescribing that open attitude to relative xenophobic societies in this 
article simply because long-distance exhortations to change basic attitudes tend to fall on deaf or resentful 
ears.  In the meantime, a comparative examination of fertility in the United States and Europe would be 
extremely interesting, but would bulk up this article well beyond s reasonable length. 
6These troubling paradoxes form the backdrop to a politics that is just beginning to 
take shape, which I call third-generation biopolitics. To give an initial definition, 
biopolitics concerns the relationship between individuals’ control over their bodies and 
the power the political community may exercise over them: both the demands it may 
make and the prohibitions it may impose.  The crises that give rise to third-generation 
biopolitics are a challenge to the premises of an earlier episode, second-generation 
biopolitics, which came into its own in the decades after World War Two, and which in 
many ways still prevails in the liberal West.  Second-generation biopolitics was premised 
on two beliefs: first, that reproductive autonomy was part of a liberal definition of 
personal freedom that set the normative boundaries of state power; and second, that there 
was no essential contradiction between that conception of freedom and the stability of 
liberal and democratic politics communities.20 Second-generation biopolitics for its part 
repudiated centuries of political thought and practice concerning the relationship between 
reproductive decisions and legal order.   The premise of first-generation biopolitics was 
that the state had a legitimate interest in the reproductive decisions of its people, and 
could act to enforce that interest.21 This idea, regarded as obvious for much of history, 
became almost taboo after the horrors of World War Two and the eugenics movements in 
Europe and the United States.22 
The problem third-generation biopolitics confronts is that the second premise of 
second-generation biopolitics is now in question: the demographic crises I have sketched 
are reminders that reproductive decisions can have systemic consequences in which the 
 
20 I describe the characteristics of second-generation biopolitics in much greater detail in III.C, below. 
21 I describe the development of first-generation biopolitics, from Thomas Malthus through a variety of 
eugenicist programs, in III.A and III.B, below.  
22 See n. 19, supra.
7legal order cannot avoid taking an interest.  That premise made the commitment to 
reproductive autonomy a matter of pure normative principle, not plagued by any stubborn 
prudential problems.  The challenge for third-generation biopolitics is to assess the 
commitment to autonomy in light of the recognition that individual reproductive choices 
can have systemic and undesirable political consequences. 
I argue that the right response is not to retreat from reproductive autonomy, but 
instead to deepen and extend it by ensuring that women exercise alongside 
complementary dimensions of autonomy: literacy, workforce participation, 
empowerment in household decisionmaking, and capacity to reconcile childrearing and 
career.  The lesson I draw from the two demographic crises is that a sustainable 
commitment to autonomy makes broader demands on the social order than has seemed 
clear before now.  The commitment to reproductive autonomy should imply commitment 
to creating and sustaining conditions in which it is not self-undermining.  Evidence from 
both Europe and Asia suggests that one variable which both increases fertility rates in 
highly developed societies and improves the sex ratio of children in less developed 
societies is women’s substantive freedom, the set of choices women available to women 
and the range of capabilities they can exercise.  In Europe, particularly, increases in 
substantive freedom come mainly through social policies that enable women to reconcile 
commitment to careers with commitment to childrearing.23 In developing countries, 
women’s literacy and workforce participation are the aspects of substantive freedom that 
bring improvements in sex ratios.  Moreover, there is some suggestive evidence that 
women’s substantive freedom works against authoritarian and extremist politics, and so 
heads off not just demographic crises, but the political responses that form the proximate 
 
23 The formulation is not gender-neutral; but neither is the social reality. 
8threat to reproductive freedom.  In all these respects, then, more autonomy rather than 
less is the best answer to the threat that autonomy may undermine its own foundations.24 
On the one hand, the basic normative commitment of modern politics is to secure 
the freedoms of persons: we assess states by how closely they adhere to these principles, 
recently to the point of authorizing intervention and overthrow where states are grossly 
illiberal and undemocratic.  Yet on the other hand, there is no perfect autonomy in 
politics, because we are also, inevitably, resources for the state.  In order to enforce a 
relatively free social order, even a state entirely free of totalitarian ambitions makes 
demands on the wealth, the conduct, and the bodies of its citizens.  Concentrating here 
only on the last – the concern of biopolitics – citizens show up for jury duty; they report 
for prison, or are taken there; and, when there is war, they show up to fight and die.  Our 
role as resources for the state is inevitable because our autonomy depends on the survival 
and integrity of the state. 
 
24 This article extends the themes of two previous papers that deal with the relationship between freedom 
and property.  In the first, I drew on the capabilities-oriented welfare economics of Nobel laureate 
economist Amartya Sen and the reform proposals of political economist Hernando de Soto, law professor 
Yochai Benkler, and economist Robert Shiller to develop what I called a freedom-promoting approach to 
property reform.  I argued that property regimes should maximize freedom, defined as capabilities, the 
power to make good one’s potential to act along all dimensions of human capacity.   I filled out this 
prescription by proposing to give priority to two types of capabilities: foundational capabilities on which 
many others supervene, such as physical mobility; and meta-capabilities, such as literacy, which enable one 
to revise or expand one’s capabilities.  In the second article, I enriched this account by developing an 
analytics of property regimes as the architecture of social relations, setting the terms on which people 
recruit one another to pursue ends ranging from survival and prosperity to more subtle forms of flourishing 
such as intimate relationships.  The aim of that argument was to take seriously the fact that people’s 
capabilities are not monadic: what we can do depends on our power to recruit others to our ends, and on our 
susceptibility to others’ recruitment of us.  Thus, to understand how a property regime shapes capabilities, 
it is necessary to appreciate the relationships of recruitment that it sets up, and so to think of freedom in a 
relational manner.  The major innovation of that article was the argument that people display a double 
character in relations of recruitment.  On the one hand, we are resources for one another’s projects, the 
objects of their enlistment and deployment.  On the other hand, we are all bearers of our own purposes, 
wishes, and aims.  Property regimes help to define the boundary between the ways others may recruit us as 
resources and the ways they are obliged to respect us as ends.  The normative kernel of that article was that, 
to maximize freedom, property regimes should maximize reciprocity in interpersonal recruitment, so that in 
enlisting one another to our aims, we must take account of others’ interests and commitments, and envisage 
our own goals relative to theirs. This article extends the picture of people as both autonomous agents and 
resources for others’ ends by bringing in the perspective of the state and the imperatives of politics. 
9Preserving autonomy therefore requires distinguishing between cases where 
personal autonomy and the health of the state are reconcilable and others where they 
come into conflict.  It is necessary to avoid two kinds of mistakes: on the one hand, 
overestimating the necessary extent of state regulation and thus excusing gratuitous 
invasions of autonomy; and, on the other hand, underestimating the need for state 
regulation and remaining sanguine about uses of autonomy that can produce serious 
problems for the state.  The challenge of third-generation politics – to reconcile the 
commitment to reproductive autonomy with recognition of its systemic political 
implications – is a new and important instance of this general problem. 
 In Part I, I describe in detail the two demographic crises I have already sketched: 
the decline of fertility rates to well below replacement level, and a disproportion in 
numbers of young women and men already totaling as many as one hundred million in 
India and China alone.  I emphasize the practical social problems that these trends imply: 
the first, a vastly increased ratio of retirees to productive workers, the second a large 
population of unmarried young men.  In Part II, I discuss the potential implications for 
politics of these demographic trends.  Declining fertility is historically associated with a 
pattern of reactionary politics and particular hostility to women’s equality and 
reproductive autonomy, a point I demonstrate with the examples of eighteenth-century 
France and Augustan Rome.  While there is no significant evidence of such a response in 
Europe today, these are relatively early days.  Whether or not that pattern holds, declining 
fertility rates present societies with a choice between revoking basic features of their 
social contracts, particularly adequate public pensions, and massively increasing 
immigration.  Put differently, that is a choice to give up either of two basic features of 
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national identity: the modern welfare state or relative homogeneity.  A politics addressed 
to that problem cannot but be full of unpalatable alternatives, from nationalism to 
intergenerational conflict.  Large populations of unmarried men are the prime targets of 
nationalist and fundamentalist parties around the world.  Moreover, they swell the ranks 
of the armed forces and criminal undergrounds, both potentially destabilizing forces in 
political crises. 
 In Part III, I put the discussion in an historical frame.  I provide a brief history of 
modern biopolitics, beginning with Thomas Malthus and the eugenics movements of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all exemplars of the first-generation premise that 
the state had a legitimate interest in reproductive decisions.  I then sketch the second-
generation commitment to autonomy, with its origins in the horrors of the Second World 
War and scientistic racism generally, and in the rise of sex equality.  Having set up both 
the background and the challenges of third-generation biopolitics, I then turn to solutions.  
In Part IV, I suggest that novel financial arrangements for international and 
intergenerational burden-sharing can mitigate the consequences of declining fertility, and 
might greatly diminish them in combination with other responses.  In Part V, I move into 
the heart of my argument for the value of an enhanced conception of autonomy.  
Beginning with Europe, I present evidence suggesting that policies that increase 
substantive freedom by enabling women and families to reconcile commitment to work 
with the desire to rear children can raise fertility rates toward, if not to, the replacement 
level.  Turning to India and China, I show that women’s substantive freedom appears to 
be the only change that improves sex ratios.  In Part VI, I observe admittedly speculative, 
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but nonetheless intriguing, reasons to hope that women’s substantive freedom might 
directly work against extremist politics.  Part VII concludes. 
I. Third-Generation Biopolitics: Two Crises 
A. The case of sub-replacement fertility 
1. Declining fertility rates and rising dependency ratios 
 For several decades in the last century, many believed that global population 
trends pointed ineluctably upward, and that the social and ecological problems of 
overpopulation were among the most significant facing the species.25 At the beginning of 
the new millennium, the facts began to change rapidly.  Global fertility, which in 1950-55 
had stood at about 5 children per woman, has fallen to 2.65.26 In 2050 it is projected to 
be 2.05 children per woman, slightly below the replacement rate of 2.1.27 According to 
the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, this trend would lead to a global population of 9.1 billion by 2050, at which time 
growth rates would have slowed considerably and population would be close to leveling 
off.28 Estimates premised on a faster decline in fertility rates show population stabilizing 
before 2040 and under 8 billion, and beginning to decline by 2050.29 
For present purposes, the most interesting question is not global population, but a 
pair of subsidiary trends: the geographic distribution of fertility decline and the ratio of 
working adults to dependents (children and the retired) in national populations.  The 
 
25 See PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION 15-17 (1990) 
(arguing that exponential growth in population has set the species on a sure path to exhausting the planet’s 
resources); PAUL H. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1974) (same). 
26 POPULATION NEWSLETTER 79 at 3 (June 2005). 
27 Id.  
28 WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2004 REVISION vi (2004). 
29 Id at vii. 
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fertility rate in developed countries now stands at 1.56 children per woman, significantly 
below replacement rate.30 Moreover, fertility levels in all the world’s 44 developed 
countries except Albania are below replacement rate, and those in 15 countries, mainly in 
Southern and Eastern Europe, have fallen below 1.3, a level “unprecedented in human 
history.”31 South Korea lies at 1.23, Poland at 1.26, Spain at 1.27, Italy at 1.28, Germany 
at 1.32, and Russia and Japan at 1.33.32 Even assuming immigration and a substantial 
rebound in fertility rates (partly on the assumption that today’s low levels reflect a 
generational decision to delay childbearing rather than reject it outright), these figures 
will have such countries’ populations declining in absolute terms between now and 2050: 
by more than 30 million in Russia, over seven million in Italy, four million in Germany, 
almost 16 million in Japan, and over three million in South Korea.33 The projected 
decline for these countries ranges from over 20 percent of today’s population in Russia, 
though more than 10 percent for Italy, to around 5 percent in Germany.34 
Declining fertility may reflect the economic incentives of a system that expects 
parents to absorb most of the cost of raising children (in contrast to retirement, which is 
publicly subsidized).  According to one recent estimate, the cost of raising a middle-class 
child in the United States is over a million dollars in the first seventeen years of life.35 
More than eighty percent of that figure comes from forgone parental wages, on the 
 
30 Id.
31 Id. at viii. 
32 Id. at 67-69.  By contrast, nine countries with high fertility and immigration rates are expected to account 
for more than half the world’s population increase before 2050.  These include the political flashpoints of 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Congo, and Ethiopia, as well as India and China.  The concentration of population 
growth in countries with unstable and potentially significant politics is itself an important and troubling 
matter, although outside the scope of this Article. 
33 Id. at 36-37. 
34 I have provided these numbers in round terms because so much uncertainty is absorbed into such 
estimates that rough magnitudes are more honest than an exaggerated precision premised on speculation. 
35 See PHILIP LONGMAN, THE EMPTY CRADLE:HOW FALLING BIRTHRATES THREATEN 
WORLD PROSPERITY (AND WHAT TO  DO ABOUT IT) 73 (2004). 
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assumption that one parent gives up a $45,000 salary at the time of the child’s birth, and 
remains out of the labor market until the child reaches 17, with the opportunity cost in 
forgone wages rising to nearly $60,000 by the end of the period.36 These figures may be 
somewhat bloated – after all, two-career families are common – but they capture the 
outlines of a massive expense. 
 Declining fertility also appears to reflect changes in values and priorities.   
Movement from traditional reproductive and family roles and toward new emphasis on 
career, self-expression, and the quality of friendship and romantic relationships all 
encourage postponing or skipping marriage and childbearing.37 A study of European 
values and family structures reveals that those who have adopted the individualist and 
counter-traditional values just enumerated are most likely to be single or involved in 
childless cohabitation, while traditionalists are most likely to have entered into 
childbearing marriages.38 The same study finds that the timing of European countries’ 
fertility declines below replacement level corresponds roughly to the timing of this 
transformation in values.39 A simpler statistical artifact of this change is a recent poll 
finding that, even absent economic constraint, German women on average express a wish 
for fewer children than two.40 
The effect of declining fertility rates is that, as cohorts age, the proportion of older 
to younger people grows.  Rising life expectancy amplifies the effect, as relatively large 
older populations stick around to keep younger and relatively smaller cohorts company.  
 
36 Id. 
37 See Johan Surkyn & Ron Lesthaeghe, Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition in 
Northern, Western, and Southern Europe: An Update, DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH Special Collection 
3, at 62-75 (April 17, 2004). 
38 Id. at 70-72. 
39 Id. at 47-48. 
40 See Old Europe, Demographic Change, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 2, 2004). 
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Thus, while overall global population is projected to increase by about 50 percent before 
2050, the number of persons aged 60 years or more is projected almost to triple, from 672 
million to nearly 1.9 million.41 In Europe, where this trend is particularly pronounced, 
the number of people of pensionable age for every 100 people of working age is 
projected to rise from 35 today to 75 in 2050, with one-to-one ratios in Italy and Spain.42 
By another estimate, those over 65 in Europe will be equivalent to 60% of the working-
age population in 2050.43 
The proximate result promises to be a very serious economic drag on countries 
already heavily burdened by public debt and slow economic growth.  An aging 
population means an increase in spending on pensions and health care; a smaller working 
population must make a larger per capita contribution to support the retired and the sick.  
The European Commission has estimated that such payments may drive up public 
spending by five to eight percentage points of GDP by 2040 in the fifteen member 
countries of the European Union, crowding out spending on productive investments.44 
Declining numbers of workers and reduced capital for investment mean, other things 
equal, a fall in economic growth: the International Monetary Fund has estimated that 
Europe’s annual growth rate will be a half percentage point lower in 2050 than now – a 
number too speculative to be meaningful, but which expresses the certainty that a 
shrinking working population putting an increased share of income into transfer 
payments cannot be good for growth.45 Taken together, diminished growth and the 
redirection of wealth to dependent populations will also crowd out spending on 
 
41 Id. at viii-ix. 
42 See Europe’s Population Implosion, THE ECONOMIST (July 19, 2003). 
43 See Half a Billion Americans? – Demography and the West, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2002). 
44 See Old Europe, supra n. 38). 
45 See id.
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international influence, either via military power or through development assistance to 
new members of an expanded Europe and the world’s poorest countries.  Summing up 
these prospects, the French Institute for International Relations has recently predicted that 
Europe faces “a slow but inexorable ‘exit from history.’”46 
B. “Bare branches” and sex asymmetry 
 In this sub-Part I treat the disproportion between men and women in populations 
where parents increasingly select for the sex of their children.47 This problem is linked to 
 
46 See Europe’s Population Implosion, supra n. 9. 
47 There is considerable debate on the relative proportions of gender disproportion caused by each of a 
variety of factors.  One class of factors expresses a preference for sons over daughters, exercised at 
different points in the cycle of conception and childhood: sex-selective abortion, infanticide, and 
preferential caregiving and medical expenditures resulting in higher levels of childhood mortality in girls 
than in boys.  For an outline of the debate over proportions among these causes, see Junhong Chu, Prenatal 
Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural China, 27 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
REVIEW No. 2 at 259 (June 1, 2001) (observing that many Western observers were skeptical that sex-
determination technology was widely available in China, while Chinese scholars resisted the suggestion 
that post-natal sex discrimination or infanticide caused the sex disparity).  Today it is clear that China’s 
domestic production capacity makes possible widespread sex-determination technology, and reported levels 
of sex ratio at birth show such a dramatic disproportion that any post-natal addition to the ratio must be 
regard as additional, not supplanting.  See infra TAN 67-71.   Another candidate is inaccurate reporting: 
some suggest that births of girls are underreported, either because of low cultural valuation of females or 
because, under China’s one-child policy, parents who wish to have a son may conceal the birth of a 
daughter in an effort to avoid enforcement of the policy.  For a discussion of this question, see Dudley L. 
Poston & Karen S. Glover, Too Many Males: Marriage Market Implications of Gender Imbalances in 
China at 8-10 (unpublished paper: on file with author).  As Poston and Glover note, however, Taiwan’s sex 
disproportion at birth approaches China, despite near 100 percent reporting and no legal constraint on 
fertility, making underreporting seem unlikely to explain the bulk of China’s sex ratio.  See id. at 9.   
Moreover, although reliable studies of the nominally illegal practices of prenatal sex-determination and 
sex-selective abortion are difficult to come by, Junhong Chu’s study of one village in which she had earned 
the trust of participants showed high levels of both practices.  See Chu, supra (this note) (reporting 39 
percent use of ultrasound sex testing during first pregnancies, 55 percent use in second pregnancies, and 67 
percent use in additional pregnancies; 27 percent of respondents reported at least one abortion, and 86 
percent of that group reported at least one sex-selective abortion).  A third candidate is, paradoxically, 
improving health overall.  Many more male than female fetuses are conceived, but because female fetuses 
are hardier than males, the natural proportion at birth only slightly favors males.  Hence, other things equal, 
an improvement in the health of pregnant women, which decreases the rate of fetal wastage (miscarriages 
and stillbirths) should increase the proportion of male fetuses.  For this argument, see Dhairiyarayar Jayaraj 
& Sreenivasan Subramanian, Women’s Wellbeing and the Sex Ratio at Birth: Some suggestive evidence 
from India, 40 J, DEVELOPMENT STUD. No. 5, at 91 (June 1, 2004).  Although attractive for its note of 
optimism (perhaps not all news of sex disproportion is bad news!) and for its application of medical insight 
to social inquiry, this explanation cannot go far.  The world’s richest countries, where fetal wastage rates 
are presumably much lower than in India or China, do not even approach the sex disproportions registered 
16
declining fertility by the common structure of third-generation biopolitics: the recognition 
that individual reproductive choices have systemic social consequences. 
 
1. The growth of the bare branches 
 A disproportion of men to women in Asian populations, the result of sex-selective 
caregiving, infanticide and, increasingly, abortion, came to widespread attention in 1990, 
when the (later Nobel laureate) economist Amartya Sen reported his calculation that, 
relative to the natural proportion of male to female births, more than 100 million women 
were “missing” worldwide.48 Although subsequent studies have modestly reduced his 
estimates (chiefly because he used sub-Saharan African births as a baseline, and the share 
of women among births in that population is slightly higher than for other groups),49 the 
figures accepted today are dramatic.  The natural sex ratio produces a slightly higher 
number of women than men in a population.50 By contrast, today’s actual sex ratio in 
China shows 106.5 men for each 100 women, and India’s 107.2 men per 100 women.51 
(Similar numbers prevail in Pakistan (108.6) and Afghanistan (106.5), and slightly less 
 
in those countries.  Political economist Emily Oster has recently drawn attention for her argument that high 
rates of hepatitis B contribute to sex disproportion by inducing higher rates of male births and female 
births; but Oster admits that hepatitis B cannot account for increases in sex disproportion over the last 
fifteen years, when infection rates have stabilized or fallen.  See Emily Oster, Hepatitis B and the Case of 
the Missing Women 2-3, Working Paper, Harvard University Center for International Development (2005), 
available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/grad_student/007.pdf (visited Feb. 19, 2006).  Oster 
makes no claim that hepatitis B could account for more than a fraction of the phenomenon.  Other 
researchers, notably Amartya Sen, have sounded extremely cautious notes about her findings, which 
although interesting are far from conclusive.  See Eve Conant, What Carried the Girls Away, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Feb. 12, 2006) (quoting Sen’s skeptical assessment).  On the existing evidence, it is very 
difficult to get away from the conclusion that sex-selective abortions and gender bias in childrearing play a 
large role in shaping existing sex ratios.  
48 See Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Dec. 20, 1990) 
at 61-66. 
49 See VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES: THE SECURITY 
IMPLICATIONS OF ASIA’S SURPLUS MALE POPULATION 58-59 (2004). 
50 See id. at 59-61. 
51 See id. at 62. 
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dramatic figures in Bangladesh (103.8) and Taiwan (104.3)).52 The gap between 
expected and actual sex ratios translates to more than 40 million “missing women” in 
China’s population of roughly 1.2 billion, and more than 39 million among India’s 
roughly one billion people. 
 Many interwoven factors account for parental sex selection in India: the higher 
status attached to male children, the superior earning potential of men over women (with 
its corollary, greater capacity to support parents and other family members), and the cost 
of providing a bride’s dowry.53 A nationwide study conducted in 1997 found that Indian 
parents on average describe a 2:1 ratio of sons to daughters as the optimal mix – a 
preference plainly incompatible with natural sex ratios.54 India’s southern states, which 
enjoy higher literacy rates than the rest of the country, exhibit the least distortion in their 
sex ratios.55 Kerala, with near-universal literacy, many female-headed households, and a 
net outmigration of males for work, is unique in having significantly more women than 
men in its population, but neighboring Tamil Nadu has a ratio of just over 101 men per 
100 women, and Karnataka, home to Bangalore, a ratio somewhat under 104:100.56 The 
national sex ratio at birth ranged from 109.8 to 113.8:100 between 1987 and 1998. 
 Two factors that promote reproductive autonomy appear also to have contributed 
to India’s present sex asymmetry.  One is the increased availability and decreased cost of 
prenatal sex-determination testing and abortion.  Between 1982 and 1987 alone, the 
number of sex-determination clinics in Bombay rose from 10 to 248.57 Amniocentesis, 
 
52 See id. 
53 See id. at 65-80. 
54 See id. at 73. 
55 See id. at 92. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 110. 
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which cost the equivalent of $88 to $117 in the 1980s, now costs $12 to $30 – a lot of 
money in a poor country, but also a huge decrease in cost for the poor.58 Ads for sex-
determination testing suggest the cost is worthwhile: “Better 500 rupees now than 
500,000 rupees later,” they warn, adverting to the potential cost of a daughter’s dowry.59 
Although there is dispute in India over how much of the country’s sex disproportion 
arises from abortion and how much from neglect of female infants, the sex bias in 
abortion is manifest.60 A Bombay study of 1,000 abortions found 97 percent were of 
females (a number that seems implausibly high).61 A study of a hospital in Punjab in the 
1980s and 1990s found that 13.6 percent of mothers of boys admitted – with reticence 
which may suggest underreporting – having undergone pre-natal sex-selection; the 
comparable figure was 2.1 percent for mothers of girls.62 The other female fetuses 
presumably were not carried to term. 
 The second interaction between reproductive autonomy and sex disproportion is 
that falling fertility rates, with their connection to increasingly mobile, expressive, and 
individualist modes of life, exacerbate sex disproportion.63 Fertility rates have fallen 
dramatically in most of India, albeit from a high baseline.64 Monica das Gupta and P.N. 
Mari Bhat have found that falling fertility intensifies the pressure for sex selection, 
because the total number of children that parents want falls faster than the number of sons 
 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 For a start on the dispute, see id. at 112-13. 
61 See id. at 111. 
62 See id. at 112. 
63 For a discussion of this cultural dimension of declining fertility, see Surkyn & Lesthaeghe, supra n. 11. 
64 India’s current fertility rates stands at 3.07 children per woman, down from 5.43 in 1970-75.  United 
Nations demographers predict a decline below replacement level in 2030-35, but that is nearly pure 
speculation.  See WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra n. __ at 68. 
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they desire.65 In consequence, carrying a female infant to term diminishes the chances of 
reaching the desired number of sons more dramatically than for a family that wants a 
larger number of children overall.  Consequently, where both economic interest and 
social esteem produce a strong preference for male over female children (or, more 
precisely, a preference for a mix of male and female children that falls well off the 
biological distribution), the broadly liberalizing trends that produce falling fertility rates 
also increase the likelihood of sex-selective abortion and, other things equal, will increase 
sexual disproportion. 
 China is the source of the term “bare branches,” which refers to “surplus men” 
who will never be able to marry in countries of “missing women.”  As noted, China’s 
male-female ratio is 106.5:100, and its “missing women” total about 40 million.66 The 
sex ratio for the population overall understates the sex disproportion among the young, 
because China’s disproportion has grown a great deal in recent years.67 Official Chinese 
publications put the ratio for children under age 5 at 118:100.68 The introduction of 
ultrasound technology for pre-natal sex identification in the 1980s seems to have 
increased the sex disproportion; an official ban on prenatal sex identification has had 
uncertain effects as yet.69 As in India, the preference for sons is powered by esteem, as 
sons are higher-status than daughters and are guarantors of family continuity, and by 
economic interest, as men are chief wage-earners and, above all, providers for their 
 
65 See Monica das Gupta & P.N. Mari Bhat, Fertility Decline and Increased Manifestation of Sex Bias in 
India, 51 POPULATION STUD. 307-315 (1997). 
66 See supra n. 49. 
67 See HUDSON & DE BOER, supra n. 10 at 131-32. 
68 See id. at 132. 
69 See id. at 171-73. 
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parents’ retirement.70 The government’s notorious one-child policy restricts the number 
of births in which families may attempt to reach the desired number of sons.71 The 
Chinese setting is thus a striking combination of traditional state coercion and 
technologically enabled reproductive autonomy, of authoritarian first-generation 
regulatory biopolitics and the new problems of third-generation biopolitics, with no stop 
at the autonomy-promoting commitments of second-generation biopolitics. 
 
2. The consequences of sex disproportion 
 The inevitable consequence of sex disproportion is that, assuming the wish to 
marry is at least as frequent in men as in women, there will be many reluctant bachelors.  
Hudson and de Boer reckon conservatively that by 2020 China will be home to between 
29 million and 33 million “surplus males” between the ages of 15 and 34.72 Their 
estimates for India range between 28 and 32 million bare branches.73 Even in the 
conservative range, these numbers raise the prospect of more than fifty million young 
men in the world’s most populous countries, who will be unable to enter adulthood by the 
usual integrating route of marriage and fatherhood. 
 What is a large population of unmarried young men likely to mean?  There are 
several parts to the answer.  First, unmarried men are statistically likely to belong to the 
lowest socioeconomic classes, to be underemployed or unemployed, and to be relatively 
 
70 See id. at 155.  Hudson and de Boer quote anthropologist Sulamith Heins Potter as describing living 
conditions for retirees without children, who rely on government support, as “pitiable,” and note that “these 
old men and women live in decrepit buildings with little food and must depend on the goodwill of 
neighbors to provide water and fuel.”  Id.  
71 In practice, the policy has been unevenly enforced, and where it is enforced, amounts in effect to a ban 
on second children in urban areas and on third children in rural areas, with significant dispensations for 
China’s ethnic minorities.  See id. at 152-54. 
72 See id. at 186. 
73 See id. at 124. 
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transient because of both their need to move for work and their lack of family-based 
community ties.74 Second, without the usual means of entering settled society, they tend, 
according to historical sociologists, to associate with other bachelors in loose societies of 
laborers, transients, adventurers, or ne’er do wells.75 The sub-cultures that develop in 
these groups are particularly prone to drug and alcohol abuse, violence, norms of extreme 
sensitivity to insult, and risk-taking behavior of all sorts.76 Third, unless they move into 
monastic or other orders that provide social integration without marriage, bare branches 
maintain a relatively alienated attitude toward settled society, and sometimes fall into an 
oppositional and opportunistically predatory stance.  Hudson and de Boer follow a 
number of historical scholars in suggesting that “surplus males” seeking outlets for 
ambition and energy populated Chinese and Indian bandit troops, freelance Chinese 
armies that spurred disastrous rebellions, and Portuguese rogue aristocrats who preyed on 
peasants and led expansionary overseas adventures.77 
These general claims appear to line up with present reality in India and China.  
Amartya Sen has observed that inter-regional contrasts in India reveal “a strong – and 
statistically very significant – relation between the female-male ratio in the population 
 
74 See id. at 188-90.  Except for the absence of family-based community ties, these characteristics present a 
serious ambiguity in the direction of causation: men are not born bachelors, but become such, and men with 
limited aptitude, family wealth, and social capital are likely to fare poorly in the marriage market.  Thus, 
while bachelorhood may exacerbate the characteristics just sketched, it is plausible that the chief dynamic 
at work is that a surplus of men means the least marriageable will be channeled into bachelorhood. 
75 See id. at 190-92 (summarizing a large amount of historical material on the characteristics of bachelor 
populations).  Particularly significant sources are DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, VIOLENT LAND: 
SINGLE MEN AND SOCIAL DISORDER FROM THE FRONTIER TO THE INNER CITY (1996); 
James F. Rooney, Societal Forces and the Unattached Male, in DISAFFILIATED MAN: ESSAYS AND 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON SKID ROW, VAGRANTS, AND OUTSIDERS (Howard M. Bahr, ed.) (1970). 
76 See id. at 192-200 (summarizing material on these populations).  Particularly significant sociobiological 
accounts of this pattern are Allan Mazur & Alan Booth, Testosterone & Dominance in Men, 21 
BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES 353-97 (1998); Allan Mazur & Joel Michalek, Marriage, Divorce, 
and Male Testosterone, 77 SOCIAL FORCES 315 (1998); Christian G. Mesquida & Neil I. Wiener, 
Human Collective Aggression: A Behavioral Ecology Perspective, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 
247-62 (1996). 
77 See id. at 200-02, 207-27, and sources cited therein. 
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and the scarcity of violent crimes.”78 Although the precise figures are debated, millions 
of Chinese are transient, semi-employed, semi-legal laborers known as the “floating 
population,” thought to be 70-80 percent male and largely unmarried.79 
In this Part, I have summarized two unsettling demographic trends: declining 
fertility and increasingly unequal sex ratios.  Both have systemic and troubling 
consequences: respectively, rising dependency rates and stresses on public pension 
systems and unmarriageable male populations lacking clear paths to settled and 
productive adulthood.  I now turn to the specifically political consequences of these 
trends. 
 
II. Demographic Crisis and Political Threat 
A. The pattern of pro-natalist politics 
 Declining fertility, or the perception of declining fertility, is not new, even if it 
has never been so widespread or dramatic as it is now.  In past episodes, an unsettling 
pattern has recurred.  Pro-natalist agitators have identified culture, values, or preferences 
– pick your vocabulary – as the source of declining fertility, and issued polemics against 
them.  Pro-natalist polemicists tend to favor a homogenous, hierarchical, and “virtuous” 
version of national community.  This form of pro-natalist politics has consistently 
identified the moral health of the political community with its fertility rate.  It has 
consequently picked out three principles as diseases on the body politic: any form of 
individualism, with its stress on personal satisfaction and development over reproduction; 
 
78 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 200 (1999). 
79 See HUDSON & DE BOER, supra n. 10 at 230-38 (further noting the widespread association of this 
population with crime and alcoholism). 
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pluralism, the acknowledgement of valid forms of life that do not honor family and 
reproduction foremost; and, above all, women’s equality. 
 I give two historical instances, one from Imperial Rome, the other from 
eighteenth-century France.  In Rome in the age of the emperor Augustus, a widespread 
perception arose that the Roman elite was failing to reproduce itself,.  In this polemical 
view, elites preferred sensual indulgence to childbearing, and pursued that preference 
through refusal to marry, contraception, abortion, exposure (abandonment) of newborns, 
and infanticide.80 Augustus responded with a decree directing each citizen to produce at 
least three children and granting certain benefits to those who met this standard while 
punishing the unmarried and the childless with penalties such as restrictions on their right 
to inherit.81 This state claim on the reproductive capacity of the citizenry was 
accompanied by a genre of declensionist polemics, complaining that the once virile and 
fecund Roman people had become effeminate, self-indulgent, and infertile.82 The attack 
was not only on self-indulgent men, but also on increasingly autonomous upper-class 
women, whose wealth and legal rights gave them a measure of control over reproductive 
decisions, which they pressed to the hilt, collaborating with or perhaps overcoming their 
husbands in declining to bear children.83 The polemical target was thus male 
individualism, but also the relative emancipation of female citizens, which enabled them 
to participate in some of the same individualist norms as their male counterparts. 
 
80 See TIM G. PARKIN, DEMOGRAPHY AND ROMAN SOCIETY 111-21 (1992) (outlining this 
perception, the evidence bearing on it, and the legal response). 
81 Id. at 115-16.  Parkin notes that many ambiguities surround this decree, prominently whether “three 
children” refers to the number born or the number surviving, and that we know little for certain about the 
frequency and severity of its enforcement.  
82 See id. at 120 (“Literary, moralistic references abound where [having no children at all] is seen as 
disgraceful but, by implication, widespread. … Pliny the Elder explicitly condemns contemporary morals, 
according to which [the status of being childless and unmarried] occupies the place of highest [authority] 
and [power] … in sharp contrast (so he would have us believe) to the ‘good old days.’”)  
83 See LONGMAN, supra n. 35 at 151-69 (outlining the patterns of cultural reaction to declining fertility).  
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 Eighteenth-century France recapitulated the Roman pattern.  For much of the 
eighteenth century it was widely believed that France was losing population.  (In fact, the 
opposite was true, mostly because mortality rates were falling, but shrinking family sizes 
and the beginning of rural emigration to towns and cities produced the impression of a 
desolated land.84) Picking up ancient tropes linking the virtue of kings to the fertility of 
their people, critics of the monarchy seized on the perceived fertility collapse for 
polemical advantage.85 Philosophes and republicans developed sociological attacks on 
the king, arguing against values and behavior that supposedly undercut fertility, which 
they associated with wealthy and aristocratic allies of the monarchy.86 Most frequent 
objects of attack were “libertines,” aristocratic men who, like their Roman predecessors, 
preferred the wealth, freedom, and episodic sexual gratification of a bachelor (and 
sometimes a “sodomite”) existence to the duties of fatherhood.87 In the years before the 
French Revolution, “the language employed to denounce celibacy became increasingly 
harsh, the proposals more Draconian.”88 
This critique crystallized in an assault on “luxury,” a line of attack shared by the 
Marquis de Mirabeau, the abbe Charles-Andre-Alexandre de Moy, and the conservative 
Melchior Grimm, among many others.89 In this account, “luxury” stood for a preference 
for social standing and the pleasures of consumption and self-cultivation over the 
expenses and burdens of childrearing.90 Mirabeau proposed a graduated tax luxury 
 
84 See CAROL BLUM, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: POPULATION, REPRODUCTION, AND POWER 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 1-4 (2002). 
85 See id. at 5. 
86 See id. at 21-60. 
87 See id. at 26-27. 
88 Id. at 43. 
89 See BLUM, STRENGTH at 45-51. 
90 See id. at 46 (“the preference for ensuring a comfortable style of life rather than producing the largest 
possible number of children was increasingly denounced as morally reprehensible”). 
25
consumption to redirect resources from pleasure and display to production and 
reproduction.91 Georges-M. Butel-Dumont contended in 1771 that the state must go 
farther and punish those who remained unmarried.92 Another polemicist argued, “if it is 
illegal to commit suicide because that means robbing the Fatherland of oneself, it should 
be all the more so to stay single [because] each citizen is obliged to contribution … his 
share of [the nation’s] perpetuation.”93 As in imperial Rome, these proposals envisaged a 
direct and powerful claim of the state on the reproductive capacity of the individual 
citizen and embraced authoritarian, even proto-totalitarian regulation to enforce the 
claim.94 
A reactionary gender politics accompanied the French pro-natalist agenda.  One 
polemical target was the alleged effeminacy of wealthy and especially aristocratic men, 
portrayed as wigged, made-up, mincing, and clad in silk.95 Another was the autonomy of 
upper-class women who, presumably under the influence of luxurious appetites, avoided 
childbearing to preserve themselves for other pleasures.  The pro-natalist Mirabeau 
described a flighty and self-indulgent new mother of a first child, a daughter, who 
declares of her disinclination to take on another pregnancy: “the job is dreadful, and I 
don’t feel like sacrificing myself for my posterity.”96 Such gender-specific polemics 
have particularly ominous political implications.  There is something totalitarian about 
 
91 See id. at 48-49. 
92 See id. at 49. 
93 Id. (quoting Ange Goudar, LES INTERETS DE LA FRANCE MAL ENTENDUS). 
94 Blum provides a number of other striking instances.  An anonymous pamphleteer in 1763 wrote that 
“Libertinage … kills millions by preventing the propagation of the species.”  The abbe Jacques-Joseph 
Duguet declared, “Anything opposed to fecundity, even if it’s only the wish, is criminal and degrades 
marriage[.]”  According to F.-B. Felice, “Onanism is opposed to the natural destination of sperm … the one 
who engages in it becomes his own murderer.  Still more criminal is the onanism committed in marriage.”  
Id. at 50-51. 
95 See id. at 49. 
96 See id. at 47. 
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insisting on a woman’s duty to reproduce.  The literal occupation of a woman’s body by 
the child in utero and the substantial hazard of childbearing (particularly before the 
advent of modern medicine) both give pro-natalist legislation an aspect of intimate 
coercion.97 
The French Revolution carried many of these polemical themes into political 
struggle and legislation.  When the laws of 13-19 February, 1790 abolished clerical vows 
of chastity, the speaker of the Assembly declared that the country could no longer tolerate 
infertile celibacy “for reasons both moral and demographic … there are 100,000 young 
women who must be married.”98 Legislative assaults on the infertile laity were less 
decisive, but pro-natalist policies accompanied severe rhetoric.  A decree of 1791 took 
the tack of today’s pro-natalist incentives, reducing personal taxes on the fathers of more 
than three children.99 The post-Terror constitution of 1795 excluded the abstentious from 
the highest levels of government, providing that “no one may be elected to the Conseil de 
Anciens … unless he is married or widowed,” that is, unless he had made a good-faith 
effort to join the chain of social reproduction.100 The deputy Louis Depuy announced, 
“The citizen is the property of the Fatherland and a part of its wealth,” a radical extension 
of the premises of first-generation biopolitics, and urged that childless unions be declared 
invalid.101 Another deputy, Charles F. Bouche, denounced all unmarried persons as 
 
97 This intuition forms the basis of Jed Rubenfeld’s anti-totalitarian argument for abortion rights.  See Jed 
Rubenfeld, Conurring opinion iin WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 109-120 (Jack Balkin 
ed.) (2005) at 111 (“A woman’s right not to be impressed into unwanted labor is no less than a man’s. … 
no law could more plainly violate this right than a law forcing a woman to bear a child”). 
98 Id. at 158-59. 
99 See id. at 159. 
100 Id. at 163. 
101 Id. at 158. 
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“parasites, in general corrupt or corrupting … a useless weight on the face of the 
earth.”102 
I have selected two examples remote from each other and from the present 
because they represent a recurrent ideological pattern in pro-natalist politics.  An actual 
or perceived decline in fertility draws attention to values and practices that take people 
away from reproduction: pluralism, individualism, polemically portrayed as decadence, 
luxury, and effeminacy, and women’s empowerment.  The new visibility of non-
reproductive ways of living raise the possibility that repopulation from generation to 
generation is not automatic, that fertility depends on a culture that honors reproduction 
and laws that reward it.  Two responses are typical.  First is a new assertion of an explicit 
state interest in reproductive choices.  Reproduction is now styled a political as well as a 
natural duty, and the citizen or subject is sometimes portrayed as the property of the state, 
a part of its stock of natural resources.  Second is an assault – polemical at the most 
modest – on non-reproductive cultural forms: luxury, individualism, and any sexual 
practice that does not produce offspring.  This way of asserting the priority of state or 
social interests over individual choice in intimate matters gives pro-natalist politics an 
affinity with modern forms of authoritarian and totalitarian politics, particularly the 
fascist apotheosis of the nation. 
There is not significant evidence that this pattern is recurring in any important 
way in Europe or Japan today.  I suggest later that this may be partly a consequence of 
women’s well-established equality, partly a result of continuing revulsion at the eugenic 
 
102 Id. at 159.  Examples abound outside the opinions of lawmakers.  In 1794, representatives of a popular 
society called (in a twist of retrospective irony) Condom addressed the Convention, complaining that 
“regenerated France is still crawling with bachelors” and urging a declaration “that celibacy is a political 
crime” and institution of “a heavy punishment upon those guilty of it.”  Id. at 162. 
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policies of the last century.103 These are early days, however, and it would be naïve to 
imagine that the same political pattern could not recur as the effects of declining fertility 
become increasingly palpable.  Other connections between demographic crisis and 
illiberal politics, while less richly instanced in history, are less speculative today. 
 
B. The Politics of Pensions and Immigration 
 An obvious response to the increase in dependency rations is to increase 
immigration of working-age adults, permitting them to stand in for the “absent” native-
born adults of a population with sub-replacement fertility levels.  This option, however, 
would likely set in motion a political crisis.  Immigration on a scale that would prevent 
dependency ratios from rising would be much greater than developed countries have so 
far embraced.  According to a United Nations estimate, Germany would need to admit 
3.6 million immigrants per year between now and 2050, against a baseline of roughly 80 
million inhabitants, to keep dependency rates constant. 104 The corresponding figure 
would be even more dramatic in countries such as Italy, Spain, and Japan, where a 
substantial decline in absolute population is now projected.105 
The numerical challenge is the least of the difficulties attending immigration.  
Germany and the rest of Europe have been politically fractured over current immigration 
levels, which are too small to make much of a dent in their dependency ratios.  In light of 
these political constraints, the Rand Corporation’s European division has concluded that 
public policy needed to focus on influencing domestic fertility because “[t]he sheer 
numbers of immigrants that are needed to prevent population ageing [sic] in the EU and 
 
103 See Part VI.A.1, below. 
104 See Old Europe, supra n. 38. 
105 See WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS, supra n. __ at 36-38.   
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its Member States are not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in 
Europe,” a judgment that considerably preceded the politically explosive riots among 
France’s North African immigrants in fall of 2005.106 
Policymakers confront two other options, neither one politically attractive.  First 
is a substantial increase in the age of eligibility for public pensions, or a harsh cut in the 
level of pension benefits.  While such reform has succeeded on the margins, particularly 
in the United States, any changes that approached offsetting the increased cost from 
demographic change would likely be political dynamite.  The recent stillbirth of Social 
Security reform even in the relatively market-oriented United States, in a time of 
conservative ascendancy, suggests the difficulty of revising this class of entitlements.107 
So does the long-running German stalemate between the Christian Democrats and the 
Social Democrats, which has so far blocked any serious reform of that country’s disaster-
bound welfare-spending commitments.108 
Increased immigration has thus emerged as a visible option in discussions of 
fertility decline, not so much to point the way to a solution as to highlight the newly 
paradoxical relationship between two aspects of national identity in Europe and Japan: 
social solidarity in the form of a generous welfare policy, and the expectation of ethnic 
homogeneity.  It was an implicit premise of those countries’ welfare policies that benefits 
would go to people with whom taxpayers identified – a pattern of ethno-national 
spending that neared perfection in West Germany’s nearly overwhelming decision to 
 
106 See Grant, et al., supra n. 14 at 135. 
107 See Ramesh Ponnuru, Why Conservatives Are Divided, N.Y. TIMES at A19 (Oct. 17, 2005) (“Social 
Security reform appears to be dead for now”). 
108 See Mark Landler, An Unlikely German Coalition Now Seems to Be More Likely, N.Y. TIMES at A8 
(Sept. 30, 2005) (noting the continuing deadlock in German electoral politics); Edmund L. Andrews, 
German Parliament Votes to Revamp Pension System, N.Y. TIMES at A4 (May 12, 2001) (on Germany’s 
halting efforts at reform). 
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absorb the former East Germany into its welfare state.  It now begins to seem that nothing 
like the current level of social support can continue unless Europe gives up even today’s 
relative homogeneity in favor of becoming a continent of immigrant societies.  To take 
that path, though, would force the question of whether welfare-state solidarity could 
survive absent ethno-national solidarity, or whether the continent’s transformation by 
immigration would transform its political cultures into less solidaristic, more laissez-faire 
societies.  The second option would push European countries in the direction of the 
United States, where relatively open immigration co-exists with minimal entitlements, so 
that the country takes on a low burden of solidarity, whether measured in fiscal 
obligations or in collective identification, by admitting foreigners. 
 The politics in which this question got worked out would be concerned centrally 
with the place of large immigrant populations in a time when sacrosanct expressions of 
social solidarity are increasingly unaffordable.  That politics would inevitably interact 
with existing rifts over the place of immigrants in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
other European countries.  Although forecasting specific developments in political 
cultures is usually a fruitless game, particularly across an ocean and at the scale of 
continents, a crisis of solidarity and ethno-national identity suggests a perfect storm for 
reactionary conceptions of the national community as ethnically homogeneous, superior 
in virtue, and under threat in its defining traditions and character.  These themes have 
plenty of pernicious potential in themselves: they also point back toward the kind of 
reactionary criticism of unorthodox sub-cultures and empowered women as drags on 
national virtue and fertility – and thus, by way of falling fertility and rising dependency 
ratios, the source of the whole problem in the first place.      
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 This is a speculative discussion, but not a wildly imaginative one.  The most 
fractious themes of Europe’s domestic politics are immigration and the future of the 
welfare state.  Both raise charged questions about the nature of national community: who 
“we” are, what we owe one another, and what the two questions have to do with each 
other.  Fertility decline brings the two issues face to face in a manner that may tend to 
make ideas of national community more rigid and reactionary at the very moment that 
practical exigencies make national populations more heterogeneous.             
 
C. Sex disproportion and politics 
 The most interesting and novel question to arise from sex disproportion is what it 
will mean for the very important political transitions that China and India are now 
undergoing.  In a time when “the future of Western political theory will be decided 
outside the West,” the development of electoral democracy in India, democratic-tending 
reform in China, and market institutions in both countries is of great moment.109 Stakes 
are high for the well-being of the more than two billion people who inhabit those 
countries, for the geo-political order they will either anchor or disrupt, and – as the quote 
just given suggests – for the future of the very institutional forms China and India are 
now pursuing and revising. 
 The first possible consequence concerns women’s status in society.  To the extent 
that gender equality is a normative aim of liberal and democratic institutions and an 
empirical contributor to the development of these institutions, resurgent gender hierarchy 
is bad for political development.110 Unhappily, sex disproportion can be bad for 
 
109 This quote comes from SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA at 198 (1997). 
110 I take up this question further in VI.A, below. 
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women’s status.  As women become relatively scarce, men increase competition to 
control them, which tends to produce early marriage, high levels of direct discipline of 
women by men, and, for the most vulnerable women, increased levels of kidnapping, sale 
as brides, and prostitution.111 Although a formalist trained in the rudiments of economics 
might imagine the contrary consequence – that increased demand for women relative to 
supply would increase the bargaining power of the women themselves – a bit of realist 
reflection reveals the problem.112 Scarcity increases bargaining power only when women 
are recognized as formal equals in bargaining, or at least are practically able to withhold 
the resources they control.  When the holder of the resource – in this case, a woman’s 
own person – cannot withhold it because of legal disability or material vulnerability, an 
increase in the value of the resource means a greater chance that she will be coerced into 
giving it up.  Thus there may be an unhappy relationship between sex disproportion and 
resurgent hierarchy in gender relations where, as in both India and China, women’s 
positions are already subordinate and vulnerable.113 
111 See Scott J. South & Katherine Trent, Sex Ratios and Women’s Roles: A Cross-National Analysis, 93 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 1096-1115 (1988). 
112 What I have just called a realist attitude would follow the classic analysis of Legal Realist Robert Hale 
in describing private economic transactions as relations of mutual coercion in which bargaining position 
depends on the parties’ respective capacity to bring threats to bear on one another.  See ROBERT L. HALE, 
FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 3-34, 385-99 (diagnosing 
property rights as establishing economic relationships of reciprocal threat and exploring modes of legal 
mitigation and equalization of threat).  Joseph W. Singer has continued to do important and theoretically 
ambitious work in Hale’s vein.  See in particular Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 611, 650-51 (1988) (“As Hale tried to teach us, every transaction takes place against a background 
of property rights. And the definition, allocation, and enforcement of those entitlements represent social 
decisions about the distribution of power and welfare. No transaction is undertaken outside this sphere of 
publicly delegated power; the public sphere defines and allocates the entitlements that are exchanged in the 
private sphere. At the core of any private action is an allocation of power determined by the state.”). One might 
also look at the issue as a matter of cultural or interpretive context, as Charles Taylor does in describing 
negotiation as involving a number of implicit presuppositions, including the nature and value of the persons 
involved.  See CHARLES TAYLOR, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15-57, at 32-33 (1985). 
113 See HUDSON & DE BOER, supra n. 10 at 73-74 (noting women’s low rates of literacy and 
employment in India, relative to those of men). 
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 The second possible consequence is the rise of potentially anti-democratic and 
illiberal institutions, either to absorb populations of unmarried men or to address the anti-
social behavior associated with such men.  The military is the foremost public institution 
suited to absorb unmarried populations; a large and restive military is also both an 
independent political actor with potentially anti-democratic goals.  These goals may or 
may not extend to coups or other overt power struggles.  They may well include pressure 
for destabilizing adventures that demonstrate – for reasons of both funding and status – 
the importance of the military.  The potential for overt power struggles exists in 
government made vulnerable by the uncertainties of political reform, as China seems 
likely increasingly to be; the potential for dangerous adventurism is manifest in China’s 
relations with Taiwan and India’s with Pakistan. 
Domestic police forces are also likely to grow in response to unmarried male 
populations.  China announced in 1999 that it would substantially increase the size of the 
People’s Armed Force, which is charged with maintaining internal stability by quelling 
unrest, protest, and rioting.114 The increase was a response to labor and political unrest, 
some of it associated with the transient “floating” population.  Interestingly, unmarried 
men may be the members of the People’s Armed Force as well as its targets: the new 
recruits have been described as “the dregs” of society, many of them with petty criminal 
backgrounds.115 Any armed locus of authority, particularly one that works at the 
intersection of ordinary law-and-order and political repression, can easily pose a danger 
to liberal and democratic political development. 
 
114 See id at 256. 
115 See Eric Eckholm, A Secretive Army Grows to Maintain Order in China, N.Y. TIMES at sec. 1, p. 6 
(March 28, 1999). 
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 The most difficult question, and the most potentially troubling, is whether 
unmarried young men are particularly likely recruits for nationalist movements and other 
extremist politics, and particularly for the violent or para-military wings of these 
movements.  India has been plagued by such organizations, mostly Hindu nationalists, 
since before its independence in 1947: the Shiv Sena, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 
and others, have been responsible for religious massacres, harassment of both minorities 
and religiously tolerant governments, and one of the founding wounds of Indian politics, 
the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi.116 While political movements are tightly 
controlled in China, nationalism stands alongside economic growth as a pillar of the 
present government’s legitimacy, and ultra-nationalist sentiment is known to be strong 
among many young Chinese.117 The role that ultra-nationalists would play in a Chinese 
political crisis cannot be more than object of speculation; but it could hardly be good for 
liberal democracy. 
 Take the case of the Shiv Sena, whose career in Mumbai and the surrounding 
state of Maharashtra combines nationalist rhetoric, street-fighting ethnic self-assertion, 
social-service provision and community-building.118 Young men, particularly those who 
face limited employment prospects in the migrant slums of Mumbai, make up the 
 
116 On the role of Hindu nationalist parties, particularly the Shiva Sena, in Indian politics, see JULIA M. 
ECKERT, THE CHARISMA OF DIRECT ACTION: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE SHIV SENA 
(2003); SIKATA BANERJEE, WARRIORS IN POLITICS: HINDU NATIONALISM, VIOLENCE, AND 
THE SHIV SENA IN INDIA (2000); ASHOK DHAWALE, THE SHIV SENA: SEMI-FASCISM IN 
ACTION (2000).  For a propagandist’s defense of the program of the RSS, see M.G. CHITKARA, 
RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH: NATIONAL UPSURGE (2004). 
117 See Geremie R. Barme, To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China’s Avant-Garde Nationalists, 34 
CHINA JOURNAL 228 (1995) (detailing the rise of a fashionable form of ultra-nationalist sentiment 
among young Chinese).  For a discussion of the dynamics of Chinese nationalism from a cultural and 
anthropological perspective, see CHINA INSIDE OUT: CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NATIONALISM 
AND TRANSNATIONALISM (Pal Nyiri & Joana Breidenbach, eds.) (2005). 
118 On the career of the Shiv Sena, see particularly BANERJEE, supra n. __ at 111-30. 
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organizational core of the party and the bulk of its militants.119 Membership in 
nationalist organizations addresses several of the needs described in the earlier 
sociological sketch of the characteristics of populations of unmarried men.120 In material 
terms, nationalist groups offer an opportunity for economic advancement, chiefly through 
patronage and participation in organized crime, particularly extortion, to young men who 
tend to fare poorly in the legitimate economy.121 In social terms, nationalist 
organizations provide community centers, shared activity, and an environment of 
solidarity in which those who are blocked from other modes of social integration, such as 
marriage and employment, can enjoy belonging and recognition in their otherwise 
unattached status.122 Ideologically and as a matter of political psychology, nationalism 
provides an abstract community – the nation – with which those otherwise socially 
displaced can identify emotionally; moreover, violent nationalism assigns these young 
men an honored role: warriors, the defenders of a nation in which, without nationalist 
ideology, they might lack any substantial place.123 In this respect, nationalism at once 
 
119 Dhawale gives a characteristic left-wing inflection to this fact: “An extremely vital element in the SS 
[Shiv Sena] social strategy was its appeal to unemployed and lumpenized youth[.]”  DHAWALE, supra n. 
114 at 73.  Banerjee offers a somewhat more subtle account, noting that Shiv Sena organizations provided 
three kinds of benefits to the young, male members who were the primary targets of recruitment: economic 
opportunity (chiefly through patronage and extortion), concrete social networks, and an ideology of 
membership or belonging in an imagined, essentially Hindu Indian identity.  See BANERJEE, supra n. 114 
at 111-13. 
120 See I.B.2, supra.
121 See DHAWALE, supra n. 114 at 64-74 (on the appeal of the Shiv Sena to economically marginal youth, 
and the party’s benefit generally from economic crisis); BANERJEE, supra n. 114 at 112-23 (describing 
economic benefits to those who otherwise lack prospects as a major part of Sena recruitment efforts). 
122See BANERJEE, supra n. 114.  She also favorably discusses the work of other observers who argued 
that “the Sena offered young Maharashtrians a sense of exhilaration not derivable solely from monetary 
gains,” but rather dependent on a sense of community built around “discipline and order” inflected by a 
spirit of “national solidarity.”  On these accounts, “the Sena men” are “unaccommodated men making a 
claim on their land for the first time, and out of chaos evolving their own philosophy of community and 
self-help.”  Id. at 118. 
123 Banerjee writes, “Many young men were … attracted by the Sena’s advocacy of violence as political 
tool … framed by a Hindu identity, as a legitimate and necessary element of political action.  Id. at 112.  
On the role of warrior identity and masculinity in Hindu nationalist politics, she describes the debt of both 
the RSS and the Shiv Sena to celebrations of a “warrior” tradition in Indian history and nineteenth-century 
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valorizes the particularly violent terms of status in populations of unmarried men and 
proposes to integrate that group-specific status into a position of honor within the 
national community.  In an irony that is at once poignant and unsettling, nationalist 
ideology sometimes places special emphasis on the warrior’s role as a defender of the 
nation’s womanhood, particularly against the depredations of an internal alien, such as 
India’s Muslims; men who lack erotic, affective, and social ties with actual women are 
thus invited to imagine themselves the protectors of the nation’s femininity.124 
III. A Brief History of Biopolitics 
 
In addressing conjoined demographic crises and political threats, the world is not 
writing on a blank slate.  The effort to formulate a political response – a third-generation 
biopolitics – must contend with the morally troubling legacy of centuries of history.  In 
this Part I survey that history and its implications for a contemporary biopolitics.125 
Hindu revivalism, and observes, “Notions of ‘masculinity’ and ‘Hinduism’ intertwined closely in the 
political identity implicit in the Shiv Sena’s message.  ‘Masculinity’ – incorporating such attributes as 
decisiveness, aggression, muscular strength, and a fighting spirit to do battle – juxtaposed feminine values, 
labeled as weakness … nonviolence, compassion, and consensus building.”  Id. at 132-33.  In her excellent 
discussion of Sena ideology, Eckert reports, “Violent action is considered not only as honest but further as 
courageous and manly. .. The insistence on the true man being defined by physical strength and physical, 
nearly unmediated violence, exemplifies the theme of the ‘recuperation of masculinity’ as a major appeal of 
the Sena.  See ECKERT, supra n. __ at 136 and infra.
124 For a discussion of this dynamic in Sena ideology, see ECKERT, supra n. 114 at 140-47. 
125 In contrast with the intercontinental focus of this article’s discussion of demographic trends, this 
treatment of the historical stages of biopolitics is rather centered on the political and legal cultures of the 
North Atlantic.  It would not really be accurate to describe China or India as having gone through the same 
first- and second-generation experiences that I ascribe to Europe and, in a lesser degree, the United States.  
In this respect, the historical material describes the origins and trajectory of the normative lenses through 
which readers trained in the North Atlantic legal cultures or that of the post-World War Two international 
human rights period are likely to understand the relationship between individual reproductive choices and 
state interests.  My rationale for treating this relatively restricted history is that the problems that define 
third-generation biopolitics really are ones that we – all the world – are in together, and in which the 
relationship between social or state interests and substantive reproductive autonomy comes into the same 
kind of difficulty and paradox whatever the historical normative developments behind it.  I am thus writing 
for my audience a regional history of “our” response to what is now, in its broad outlines, a global problem.  
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 The French obsession with fertility as an expression of national vitality or decline, 
the fruit of the king’s just rule and a barometer of virtue and vice in the population, began 
as part of an old tradition of magical association between fertility and the health of the 
realm.  By the decades following the French Revolution, however, that obsession had 
become a policy aim steering the regulatory apparatus of the early-modern state.  This 
aim was premised on the main idea of the first hundred and fifty years of biopolitics, 
what I call the First Generation: that citizens and subjects were in good part resources for 
the nation, and that like any important resource, they merited appropriate regulation in 
the national interest.  With the end of the Second World War and the rise of new attention 
to reproductive autonomy, this premise came into disrepute, replaced by the main idea of 
Second Generation biopolitics: reproductive decisions belong to those who make them, 
and any legitimate interest of the state lies in public morality and the well-being of 
individual citizens, not the maintenance of a pool of material resources composed of 
living human bodies.  The problems of Third Generation biopolitics emerge against the 
backdrop of the repudiation of the First Generation and the rise of the Second Generation. 
 
A. Thomas Malthus and Demographic Pessimism 
Thomas Malthus enjoys the rare distinction of having bequeathed his name to a 
view of the world, one premised on the application to human beings of a putative 
biological principle: “the constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the 
nourishment prepared for it.”126 He applied this principle to human beings in the form of 
a simple and grim cycle in demographics and economics.  Whenever wages (or other 
 
126 THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 14 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, Donald Winch, ed.) (1803). 
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income) rose high enough to support fertility above the replacement rate, human beings 
responded with offspring.127 A rising population meant a larger workforce, which drove 
down wages to the point of privation, even starvation.128 “The poor,” Malthus wrote, 
“consequently must live much worse, and many of them be reduced to severe distress.”129 
The distressed poor would be unable to afford to marry or bring their children alive 
through infancy, which would induce a fall in population.130 This in turn would drive 
wages high enough to support reproduction at or above the replacement rate, beginning 
the grim cycle again.131 
Although he is nowadays remembered in intellectual shorthand as a pessimist 
who failed to appreciate that rising productivity would enable a finite world to feed many 
more people than it once could, Malthus was very much a practitioner of demographic 
politics.132 The son of a radical minister who had embraced the French Revolution as an 
emblem of the promise of human improvement, Malthus turned sharply against his 
father’s political optimism.133 His argument is very much about the limits of politics; he 
 
127 See id. at 25-26.  Malthus wrote of this principle, “The passion between the sexes has appeared in every 
age to be so nearly the same that it may always be considered, in algebraic language, as a given quantity.”  
Id. at 40. 
128 See id. at 25-26. 
129 Id. at 25. 
130 See id. at 25-26. 
131 See id. 
132 It is worth noting that although Malthus seems to have envisioned a steady-state economy and is thus 
routinely criticized for failing to anticipate that productivity increases would enable a finite world to feed a 
growing number of people, his thesis does not depend on the steady-state premise.  On the contrary, the 
thesis that population will always increase in excess of the resources available to support it can apply at any 
level of productivity increase that does not outstrip the maximum potential rate of reproduction.  Such a 
view, for instance, seems partly to have underlain Marx’s contention that the development of capitalism 
would lead to the steady impoverishment of the proletariat.  On the connection between Malthus and Marx 
in this respect, see David Singh Grewal, The Demographic Contradiction of Capitalism (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
133 See Donald Winch, Introduction in MALTHUS vii-xxiv, supra n. 123 at vii (describing Malthus’s father 
as “an ardent follower of Rousseau” and likely “attracted by [William] Godwin’s anarchistic vision a 
perfect egalitarian society without government or social hierarchy”).  
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argued relentlessly that unyielding tendencies in human nature severely constrained the 
power of political reform to improve human circumstances.134 
Malthus did concede that human reproduction differs from that of other species 
because people make self-conscious decisions in accord with plans of life.135 He referred 
to “preventive checks” on population as unique to humans, while “positive checks,” 
forming the cycle of overreach and privation sketched above, held for all forms of life.136 
He classified the uniquely human “preventive checks” into “moral restraint,” meaning 
celibacy or at least continence, and “vice,” which included all “irregular gratifications” of 
the sexual desire, all of which he regarded as degrading to human dignity and especially 
to female character.137 He does not seem to have regarded vice as an appropriate goal of 
public policy.  He treated moral restraint as a product of gradual increases in individual 
virtue, expressing doubt that even education in his demographic principles would 
persuade the poor to limit their reproduction.138 
Malthus’s polemical targets were visionary reformers.  The thrust of his argument 
was that neither redistribution of wealth nor other reform in the economic or political 
order could improve the human lot, because by inducing the poor to reproduce faster, 
they would only intensify the cycle of expansion and privation.  Malthus thus devoted a 
great deal of his Essay to deriding the programs of socialist reformers, including the 
 
134 See id. at ix (“Malthus embarked on a life-long attempt to show that those who attributed human 
suffering to defective social and political institutions overlooked one of its perennial sources and were 
guilty of a fundamental error”). 
135 See MALTHUS, supra n. 123 at 21-22. 
136 See id. at 21. 
137 See id. at 22-23. 
138 Malthus suggested that “mere knowledge of these truths” might “not operate sufficiently to induce any 
marked change in the prudential habits of the poor.”  He did,  however, insist that his thesis did not deny 
the possibility of progress, but only restricted its possible sources: “To the laws of property and marriage, 
and to the apparently narrow principle of self-love, which prompts each individual to exert himself in 
bettering his condition, we are indebted for … everything that distinguishes the civilized from the savage 
state.”  
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Marquis de Condorcet and Robert Godwin, and to attacking England’s laws for support 
of the poor as futile.139 The more ambitious the reform, the greater the burst in fertility 
and the immiseration that would follow.140 Moreover, under conditions of want, an 
egalitarian allocation of property would give way to resurgent proletarianism as hungry 
laborers succumbed to hard bargains: soon enough, the division between workers and 
owners would be restored, however visionary the plan of reform that had sought to 
replace it.141 
Thus Malthus drew from his demographic principles a lesson of political 
quietism.  He concluded, 
That the principal and most permanent cause of poverty has little or no relation to 
forms of government, or the unequal division of property; and that, as the rich do 
not in reality possess the power of finding employment and maintenance for the 
poor, the poor cannot, in the nature of things, possess the right to demand them, 
are important truths flowing from the principle of population[.]142 
The purpose of his argument was thus “less … to propose new plans of improving 
society, than to inculcate the necessity of resting contented with that mode of 
improvement which is dictated by the course of nature,” that of incremental individual 
growth in the virtue of self-restraint.143 
139 See id. at 45-123.  
140 Malthus’s treament of Godwin’s egalitarian program takes this argument in its strongest form, 
imagining a society of perfect equality in which demographic crisis and reversion to inequality promptly 
follow as a result of demographic laws.  See id. at 56-67. 
141 See id. at 65-67. 
142 Id. at 329. 
143 Id. at 327.  Again, Malthus was hardly a pure reactionary.  He expressed hope that “the representative 
system,” by improving the standing of poor members of the community, would give them both something 
to hope for and something to lose, and thus induce a greater measure of prudence.  Nonetheless, his 
constant theme was skepticism of reform.  He wrote,  
But though the tendency of a free constitution and a good government to diminish poverty be 
certain; yet their effect in this way must necessarily be indirect and slow, and very different from 
the direct and immediate relief which the lower classes of people are too frequently in the habit of 
looking forward to as the consequence of a revolution.  This habit of expecting too much, and the 
irritation occasioned by disappointment, continually give a wrong direction to their efforts in 
favour of liberty, and constantly tend to defeat the accomplishment of those gradual reforms in 
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B. The Vicissitudes of Human “Improvement” 
The marriage of demographic science and policy science which Malthus proposed 
became the core of first-generation biopolitics, although usually with more robust aims 
than Malthus’s, which were mainly proscriptive.  Throughout the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth, the premises remained that (1) individual reproductive decisions had a 
substantial effect on the national interest and (2) policy decisions could legitimately take 
account of this interest in seeking to influence or dictate reproductive patterns. 
As early as the opening decades of the nineteenth century, English reformers 
concerned to ameliorate the severe conditions of the industrial working class had married 
Malthus’s belief that overpopulation caused poverty to a non-Malthusian confidence that 
scientific progress could induce rapid improvements in well-being.144 These reformers 
broke with Malthus’s identification of birth control as “vice,” taking it instead as a 
critical instrument of progress.145 In the following decades, American utopians such as 
those in New York’s Oneida community attempted new modes of sexual regulation, 
including “male continence” (which depended on refraining from ejaculation, and would 
certainly have struck Malthus as “vice”) and “stirpiculture,” an Oneida eugenic practice 
aimed at improving the race by both selective breeding and innovative childrearing.146 
Later in the century, biopolitics became linked to a less communitarian and more statist 
utopian program that anticipated full-blown racialist eugenics.  Operating without a well-
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founded genetic account of inheritance, reformers connected the qualities of children with 
the state of mind of the parents at conception, and thus argued for loosening or abolishing 
marriage laws to produce children born of love, not duty, who would accordingly display 
superior moral qualities.147 More systematically, radicals of the post-Civil War period 
argued that increasing equality for women would “improve the race” along all 
dimensions, as women with power over their reproductive choices would (1) have fewer 
children to avoid the risk to health and life of childbearing; (2) choose fathers with an eye 
to the genetic patrimony of their children; and (3) conceive and bear children in a state of 
mind that would produce good qualities in offspring.148 
At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, biopolitics 
turned toward the anti-immigrant and white-supremacist eugenics that persists in 
infamy.149 Demographers warned that falling birth rates among native-born, and 
especially educated, white Americans, coupled with the high fertility of immigrant 
groups, could result in the complete replacement of the first population by the second.150 
Sounding anti-feminist (as well as pro-natalist) themes from pre-Revolutionary France 
and even Augustan Rome, the enemies of “race suicide” assailed educated and wealthy 
women, whom statistics showed to be slow breeders, and warned that women’s 
participation in the workforce detracted from their roles as wives and mothers.151 
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 attacked women who avoided having children as 
“criminal against the race … the object of contemptuous abhorrence by healthy 
 
147 See id. at 73-77. 
148 See id. at 80-85.  Although Gordon presents this species of optimism as quaint, I believe it has some 
value when stripped of pseudo-scientific pretensions.  In fact, my argument in the latter portions of this 
article runs along the same lines. 
149 See id. at 86-104. 
150 See id. at 88 (discussing this warning, issued by demographer-sociologist Robert Hunter). 
151 See id. at 86-89. 
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people.”152 Across the Atlantic, the same anti-feminist and anti-decadence themes 
sounded in the Germany of World War One, where the importance of healthy bodies as a 
national resource came to the fore in the long slaughter of trench warfare.153 Much the 
same response followed World War One in France, where in 1920 the Chamber of 
Deputies overwhelmingly passed an anti-contraceptive measure, an emblem of both the 
“almost universal support” for pro-natalist values and “the new willingness of the French 
state to legislate on its behalf.”154 
However pernicious were the eugenicist programs that preceded World War Two, 
the slide of scientific and pseudo-scientific demographic policy into genocide marks a 
horrific rupture in history and conscience, which needs no rehearsal here.  The 
aggressively pro-natalist nationalism of Nazi policy was part and parcel of the 
eliminationist hatred toward “non-Germans” and “non-Aryans,” particularly Jews.  As 
the West struggled to absorb the crimes of the world’s most literate and scientifically 
advanced country, talk of “race suicide,” of improving the national stock, of the duty to 
produce for the nation, all took on aspect of the criminal, torrid fascist fantasy of ethnic 
sameness, of a nation without strangers.  In retrospect, there was horror hidden (or not so 
hidden) in the pragmatic defenses of German sterilization policy in the American 
eugenicist Eugenical News; the matter-of-fact transmission of German eugenicist claims 
about Jewish rates of inherited disorders in the Journal of American Medicine;155 and 
 
152 See id. at 86. 
153 See Elisabeth Domansky, The Transformation of State and Society in World War I Germany, in 
LANDSCAPING THE HUMAN GARDEN: TWENTIETH-CENTURY POPULATION MANAGEMENT 
IN A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 46-66 (Amir Weiner, ed.) (2003). 
154 Mary Louise Roberts, French Pronatalism and the 1920 Abortion Law, in LANDSCAPING THE 
HUMAN GARDEN, supra n. 150  at 92, 91-101. 
155 See EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN 
TO CREATE A MASTER RACE 297-301 (2003).  I have avoided drawing on the arguments of this 
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s pronouncement in Buck v. Bell that “three generations 
of imbeciles is enough.”156 After such knowledge, what forgiveness?  There was little for 
the idea that the physical health of the national community, conceived in racial terms or 
in the imagery of fertility and virility, could be anything other than a marker along the 
way to totalitarianism. 
 
C. Second-Generation Biopolitics: The turn to autonomy 
The end of the Second World War ushered in a set of changes that moved 
biopolitics decisively away from the conception of persons as state resources and instead 
made reproductive choice a basic dimension of a new conception of autonomy, one based 
in keeping the state out of judgments of conscience and decisions about intimate 
relations.  One overwhelming negative motive drove this change: horror at what eugenic 
politics had wrought in Naxi Germany.  The change also had several affirmative sources, 
which developed partly in response to eugenic totalitarianism and genocide.  One was the 
rise of international human-rights culture, with its universalist commitment to securing 
individuals against state abuses.157 Another was the women’s movement, wihich brought 
trans-Atlantic and eventually global demands for women’s equal social, economic, and 
political participation, and which whose leaders and members were almost uniformly 
 
polemical book, but it contains considerable archival research on the eugenicist and other medical literature 
of the period shortly before the Holocaust. 
156 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
157 See CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
WOMEN Art. 10 (committing signatories to provide “[a]ccess to specific educational information to help 
to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and advice on family planning”); Art. 
12 (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care 
services, including those related to family planning”). 
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committed to reproductive autonomy. 158 A third, specific to the United States, was the 
turn of the Constitutional jurisprudence of personal autonomy from the Lochner-era 
concern with rights of property and contract in a Free-Labor economy to the post-New 
Deal emphasis on securing the individual conscience and life-path, including choices 
about childbearing and intimate relations.159 A final and critically important factor, 
which produced a massive increase in reproductive choice even where autonomy-based 
principles of sexual equality were weak or nearly absent, was the advent and diffusion of 
inexpensive and effective contraceptive technology, which greatly increased the degree 
of choice in conception independent of abortion rights; similar developments in abortion 
technology increased the real capacity of women to control childbearing even where 
abortion remained illegal, and considerably increased the efficacy of the right to abortion 
where it was protected.160 
The implicit empirical supposition in the era of reproductive autonomy is that 
individual reproductive choices do not produce aggregate results in which the state has a 
 
158 See GORDON, MORAL PROPERTY at 242-78 (discussing the interaction of the women’s movement 
and abortion law and politics in the United States between the late 1930s and the late 1970s);  Dorothy 
McBride Stetson, Introduction: Abortion, Women’s Movements, and Democratic Politics, in ABORTION 
POLITICS, WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS, AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF STATE FEMINISM 1-16 (Dorothy McBride Stetson, ed., 2001) and passim (discussing the 
relationship between women’s movements and abortion law in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, and Italy). 
159 See Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, Lawrence v. Texas; BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 146-62 (describing Griswold and its progeny as interpretively transformed 
applications of the deep-seated constitutional principle of protecting essential interests against state 
interference).  For a flavor of the theories of autonomy that have sprung up around the jurisprudence of 
abortion, see WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS 
REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVEERSIAL DECISION 63 (contribution of Reva Siegel, 
arguing that “criminal abortion statutes … coerce pregnant women to perform the work of motherhood” 
and cannot survive the principles of equal citizenship embodied in the Fourteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution), 109 (contribution of Jed Rubenfeld, denying that “the law [can] force 
women to bear children against their will” and finding in constitutional autonomy jurisprudence a 
repudiation of the long history in which “societies have found ways to keep women from deciding freely 
whether or when they will bear children”). 
160 See Susheela Singh et al., Abortion: A Worldwide Overview in THE SOCIOCULTURAL AND 
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Alaka Malwade Basu, ed., 2003) 
(surveying incidence and safety levels of abortion worldwide). 
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legitimate interest sufficient to justify coercive reproductive policy.  Justice Jackson’s 
famous observation that the Constitution is not a suicide pact implies an empirical 
judgment about the operation of fundamental rights: that in the vast majority of 
circumstances, individual autonomy will be compatible with the political governance, 
economic operation, military security, and intergenerational reproduction of the polity.161 
The prominence of reproductive autonomy in second-generation biopolitics, similarly, 
supposes that reproductive choice is not a demographic suicide-pact.162 The two trends 
that this article has explored, population decline and sex disproportion, present a basic 
challenge to the coherence and viability of second-generation biopolitics: the possibility 
that individual reproductive decisions produce aggregate results with serious 
consequences for the well-being of the entire polity. 
Having laid out the historical background to today’s biopolitics, I now turn to the 
first of two discussions of partial but promising solutions.  In the next Part, I argue that 
novel financial arrangements can make possible intergenerational burden-sharing on the 
international level to make up some of the demographic asymmetries produced by 
declining fertility within countries while avoiding the political hazards of achieving the 
same benefits through immigration.  This approach may provide some help in threading 
the needle I described earlier in III.B: the unhappy conjunction of two crises in the 
 
161 For a discussion of how changing facts may alter the balance among competing principles and pare back 
the domain of autonomy, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN 
AGE OF TERROR (2004) (arguing that many features of everyday freedom suppose the good faith of 
others, which a prevalent terrorist threat undermines). 
162 Neo-Malthusian arguments that population growth was out of control persisted throughout the period of 
second-generation biopolitics.  Although those who were alarmed by population growth argued for a state 
interest in the aggregate results of reproductive decisions, their conclusions tended to support the agenda of 
reproductive autonomy inasmuch as they sought to promote family-planning measures.  Some, of course, 
crossed the line into support for China-style controls on family size, which set them athwart the spirit of 
second-generation biopolitics.  For a sample of both aspects of this position, see EHRLICH & EHRLICH, 
supra n. 23 at 202-19 (arguing that education and economic opportunity are the best long-term tools for 
reducing population growth, but also evincing considerable sympathy for China’s one-child policy). 
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European and Japanese ideas of solidarity, the first a financial crisis in the welfare state 
and the second a threat to the ethnic homogeneity that social solidarity has long 
presupposed. 
Before starting this discussion, I should note that I do not admire ethnic 
homogeneity as a basic of national identity: quite the contrary.  I propose a way to save 
parts of the European and Japanese models of social solidarity because the alternative 
may be worse, and because I believe solidarity is a value worth carrying forward into a 
more heterogeneous world.  Changing everything at once brings risks better avoided; one 
of the major aims of public policy should be to affect the direction and sequence of 
sweeping changes to preserve the good that they endanger while taking advantage of the 
good potential that they bring.  My proposal in the next Part is in that spirit.     
 
IV. Intergenerational and International Burden-Sharing: The First Line of 
Engagement 
As noted earlier, Europe and other regions with declining populations could 
supplement their adult workforce and thus shore up the age-ratio that keeps public 
pensions viable, by permitting increased migration from the world’s poorer countries.163 
Yet his idea is politically unpalatable and probably unviable in most European polities, 
let alone xenophobic Japan; in both hemispheres, hostility toward foreigners and 
skepticism about the possibility of integrating newcomers politically and culturally lines 
have produced calls for new immigration restrictions, the opposite of what fiscal 
solvency would require.164 While there have also been calls for opening international 
 
163 See discussion and citations in II.B, supra.
164 See id. 
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labor markets, they have come mostly from commentators on the far left, and have had 
little traction among mainstream students of international relations, let alone politicians 
and voters.165 The political impediments to this response to population contraction raise a 
variation on an earlier question: Is the nation-state a suicide pact?  Does policing national 
borders to maintain relative homogeneity make a modern welfare state unsustainable 
when population is declining? 
 A novel form of fiscal policy offers a chance to achieve some of the benefits of 
labor migration without absorbing its political cost.  While at best only a partial and 
experimental response, and somewhat different in emphasis from my main argument 
about the importance of increasing substantive autonomy, it has enough promise and 
relevance to deserve a place in this discussion, even if mostly as a conversation-starter.166 
The model, proposed by Yale economist Robert Shiller, rests on the new technological 
viability of complex contracts for the sharing of risk and benefit across large populations 
over time.167 The general form of Shiller’s proposal concerns the implications of new 
data-gathering and information-management technologies for risk-pooling.168 Pooling 
 
165 See, e.g., MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 396-400 (calling for open migration).  
On the paucity of attention to open labor markets even among those who strongly advocate open markets in 
capital and goods, see David Singh Grewal, Free Trade & Politics (reviewing Martin Wolf, Why 
Globalization Works & Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization) (forthcoming, ETHICS & INT’L 
AFFAIRS (2006).   
166 As I note, this proposal is not original to me, although I believe its application to this problem is 
original.  I lack the training to defend it in full detail, either theoretical or institutional – i.e., I have neither 
an economics Ph.D. nor experience as a financial analyst or risk broker.  Moreover, this proposal is a 
different sort of animal from the material on substantive freedom that I treat in the next Part, and which 
makes up the bulk of my proposals to address the problems of third-generation biopolitics.  My reasons for 
including this proposal nonetheless are that (1) it seems inevitable that a suite of policy responses will be 
necessary to mitigate the demographic and political problems I am tracing; every bit helps; (2) institutional 
experimentation may take flight on the wings of necessity, so that an idea that seemed far-fetched under 
ordinary circumstances would seem worth a try under exigent ones; and (3) it is a familiar role of the law 
professor to engage in disciplinary arbitrage, advancing certain ideas not by refining their formulation, but 
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167 See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2003). 
168 See id. at 110-20. 
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risk through private and social insurance is, of course, one of the great advances of 
modern economic life, enabling individuals to diffuse losses that would otherwise be 
financially devastating by replacing the risk of massive costs that one must bear oneself 
with a probability-discounted periodic or lump-sum payment in the form of an insurance 
premium.  Notoriously, however, insurance is dogged by moral hazard, the tendency of 
individuals who can externalize the costs of their actions to behave in riskier ways than 
they otherwise would, whether by driving recklessly or, where the insurance is income 
support, by accepting unemployment and collecting checks.  Shiller proposes that 
collection and aggregation of data for the entire sector or region of the economy in which 
the insured participates, rather than the individual’s employment status or income, can 
enable an insurer to differentiate between losses that reflect sectoral changes beyond the 
individual’s control and others that are merely local to the individual: in a scheme of 
income support based on such data, payments would be based not on individual income, 
but on whether the average income of sector participants had fallen below a specified 
baseline. 
The data index that Shiller proposes to solve the moral hazard problem for income 
insurance provide the basis for what Shiller calls “macro-markets,” effectively index 
funds that would make possible investment in entire economic sectors or even national 
economies.  He envisions, for instance, an agreement between nations to share portions of 
their GDP to compensate for performance above or below a specified baseline of 
expectation, making possible some hedging against even national-level economic 
downturns.169 These would not be charitable arrangements, but self-interested contracts 
aimed blunting the edge of bad luck.  One can imagine, for instance, the benefits to 
 
169 See id. at 175-85. 
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regional stability of a contract that would have given Argentina’s and Indonesia’s 
governments a share of China’s booming national income during the disastrous financial 
contractions those countries experienced at the turn of the millennium – as one can 
imagine the appeal to all parties of entering into such an agreement ex ante, when none 
knew which would experience a short-term fiscal crisis and which a continuing 
expansion.170 
The concept of macro-markets for international agreements has potential 
application to the fiscal crises of demographic contraction.  Labor migration – the 
solution Europe, Japan, and Korea are likely to resist for political and cultural reasons – 
is an individual response to differences in wage rates (adjusted for cost of living, 
availability of employment, and so forth) across nations.  These rates, in turn, reflect the 
ratio of labor to capital in each economy, with high-capital countries paying more for 
relatively scarce labor, and plentiful labor taking low wages in relatively low-capital 
countries.171 In a borderless world where the cost of migration were zero, populations of 
workers would rearrange themselves – as capital has already begun to do – until a single, 
global average wage emerged for each occupation.172 Liberalization of international 
labor markets would allow workers in low-wage countries to take advantage of high 
European wages, with some dragging effect on European wage rates, but also with the 
more-than offsetting benefit of increasing the population of workers paying into 
 
170 On the Indonesian financial crisis, see Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian 
Financial Crisis, in CURRENCY CRISES 105 (Paul Krugman, ed.) (2000).  On the growth of China, see 
Keith Bradsher, China Reports Another Year of Strong (or Even Better) Growth, N.Y. TIMES at C5 (Jan. 
26, 2006) (reporting 9.9% growth in Chinese GSP in 2005, a figure in line with the last fifteen years of 
growth). 
171 This is of course a simplified picture, particularly in its neglect of the human capital dimension of labor, 
which significantly affects the marginal economic value and thus the wage rate of workers. 
172 This account, of course, leaves out the determinants of variation in wages within a single labor market, 
such as compensation for geographically undesirable locations.  The exposition is deliberately simplified, 
but not, I trust, to the point of distortion. 
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Germany’s social-pension system.  The question is whether a complex international 
financial arrangement might take advantage of the same differential without moving 
bodies across borders. 
 Imagine a contract of this form.  The governments of Germany, Japan, the 
European Union, or all of these commit for a period of two decades to subsidize public 
investments in education, public-health, and infrastructure in India and China.  In return, 
the Indian and Chinese governments commit a share of their future GDP’s, roughly from 
the decades of working life of the cohorts that benefit from the rich countries’ payments, 
to the governments of the investor countries.  These payments will subsidize the public 
pension plans of the investor countries when their “missing” workers (those not born 
under a sub-replacement birthrate) would otherwise have been contributing payroll taxes 
to the national fisc. 
These contracts would take advantage of the same the same resource differentials 
that drive labor mobility.  The developing countries are rich in population, particularly 
young population, relative to their supply of capital for health and education to raise the 
value of their rising cohorts.  The rich countries, by contrast, are rich in capital but 
relatively poor in population, particularly the working population of the coming 
generation.  Under the contract envisioned here, the rich countries’ capital would help 
prepare the next working generation in labor-rich and capital-poor countries for 
productive careers.  In return, workers in the latter countries would effectively become 
payors into the public pension systems of the capital-rich countries, replacing a portion of 
their diminishing working-age populations. 
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 These expenditures would not be foreign aid, but rather in the nature of 
investments.  The contracts would enable capital-rich, high-wage countries and labor-
rich, low-wage countries to take advantage of asymmetric levels of development without 
incurring the political costs of massive migration.  The contract could be written as a risk-
sharing instrument at both ends, so that the investor country’s contributions would be 
contingent on its GDP during the years of its payment, or could be based, like many 
investments, on fixed payments by the investor in return for a share of a designated pool 
of wealth or income later.173 The investment structure of the contract would produce 
incentives, usually missing from foreign aid, for the investing countries to monitor and 
police performance in the expenditure of their investments. 
 Would returns from the investment be meaningful?  Consider the returns from an 
index fund in the Chinese or Indian economy nowadays, when those two are doubling 
every seven and ten years, respectively.174 The contract proposed here would be a way 
for a country, or its pension system in particular, to make an investment of this form.  The 
terms of the contract, of course, would depend on the parties’ forecasts for the 
performance of the developing economies; but that is nothing unusual in an investment 
contract. 
 The attractiveness of an investment in this form would also depend on how the 
investing companies construed their alternatives.  Specifically, it would be reasonable to 
compare the costs and benefits of alternative approaches to the fiscal problems that come 
 
173 Of course, the poor countries’ repayments might also be fixed, which would provide some assurance for 
rich-country pension plans but perhaps considerable disincentive to poor-country governments, reluctant to 
should the burden of carrying European or Japanese retirees regardless of their financial capacity to do so. 
174 As noted at supra n. 166, China’s annual rate of growth has been around 10 percent.  India’s annual 
growth rate has been in the neighborhood of seven percent.  See Saritha Rai, India: Growth, Still Strong, 
Slows, N.Y. TIMES at C5 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
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with fertility decline.  Earlier sections of this article have laid out the high costs of doing 
nothing at all: a massive increase in the dependency ratio and a potentially crushing 
burden on public pension systems.  This section opened with a discussion of the political 
costs of reducing the dependency ratio by increasing immigration levels: a rise in nativist 
sentiment and backlash against liberalized immigration.  The most politically attractive 
solution, pro-natalist policies aimed at reconciling family and work, come at a high fiscal 
cost and seem, from the experience of France and the Nordic countries, to cushion but not 
avert the effects of fertility decline.  Therefore, absent some new strategy, reciprocal 
international investment would seem a fiscally attractive and politically viable way to 
approach the problem.  Naturally, there is no reason that adopting one solution would 
exclude pursuing another at the same time.  The aim would be an optimal mix of 
strategies, measured both in present cost and in risk-discounted levels of expected 
benefit.  At a minimum, the contract envisioned here would be a strong candidate for a 
place in that mix. 
 Would countries receiving payments in the early stages of the contract pay their 
obligations later?  There is no easy way to repossess years of investment in health and 
education, and geriatric countries are not, other things equal, the most likely to go to war 
to collect their pension payments.175 These concerns are not empty; but countries have a 
remarkable record of faithfully repaying debt, even when the obligations date back to 
now-repudiated regimes or the payments make up unconscionable shares of public 
 
175 Although superficially flip, the point that aging countries are relatively unlikely to project force in 
international relations is a serious contention of analysts concerned with fertility decline.  See LONGMAN, 
EMPTY CRADLE, supra n. 35 at 20-21 
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expenditure.176 History provides as much reassurance as could reasonably be asked that 
governments would honor the debts envisaged in these hypothetical contracts. 
In this Part, I have argued that one partial solution to the problem of declining 
fertility lies in novel financial arrangements that can make possible intergenerational 
burden-sharing among nations.  This approach might enable countries with declining 
populations to take some of the benefits of increased immigration with the political costs.  
In the next Part, I turn to a more basic approach to both declining fertility and sex 
disproportion: promoting women’s substantive freedom. 
 
V. Women’s Empowerment, Sex Ratios, and Politics: The Second Line of 
Engagement 
Both declining fertility and sex disproportion respond to the substantive freedom 
of women.  By “substantive freedom” I mean not just what women are formally 
permitted to do, but what they are in fact able to do.177 For instance, while the absence of 
a censorship law might constitute formal freedom to read about feminism or family 
 
176 See SHILLER, supra n. __ at 181 (pointing out that such obligations are in general honored even in 
exigent circumstances). 
177 This distinction tracks the “substantive” definition of reproductive autonomy that I gave for purposes of 
this article at n. 11, supra. As there, I do not mean to make any point about the desirability or importance 
of a focus on formal freedom, or nominal legal permission to act in a certain way.  Rather, I am simply 
interested in a more inclusive metric of freedom, which I find captures many of phenomena that motivate 
this paper.  There is, of course, a serious problem in measuring substantive freedom as a “greater” or 
“lesser” quantum, a problem that generally plagues any effort to measure human well-being in an objective 
or “cardinal” rather than a subjective or “ordinal” sense – a problem, that is, for any attempt to judge 
aggregate human welfare or flourishing other than by revealed preferences.  On the intellectual origins and 
continuing relevance of this problem, see Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrongs 
About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507 (1984) (describing the rise of ordinalism as a Kuhnian 
paradigm shift that made some questions tractable by setting aside others, rather than a simple advance in 
methodological insight).  I do not purport to solve that problem here, but rather to concentrate on the 
implications of substantive increases in freedom in particular domains: literacy, workforce participation, 
and, in consequence of these, participation in the decisionmaking of the household.  In these specific 
domains, if not in social aggregates at large, it is possible to say (1) what the object of inquiry is, i.e., what 
we are talking about and (2) whether we are looking at more or less of it in a particular context.  It may be 
that an attention to substantive, objective, or cardinal measures of well-being or capability requires this 
kind of move to the particular; but I leave that question to another time. 
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planning, only literacy, combined with access to books, pamphlets, or online pages, 
would count as substantive freedom to read; similarly, while women might be formally 
allowed to enter the labor market, unequal education, a husband’s threat to punish a wife 
for working, or the sexist attitudes of potential employers would all weigh against 
counting women as substantively free to work.178 Because these distinctions may seem 
fairly abstract, and their content will vary from context to context, I will now break down 
the argument by way of particular cases. 
 
A. Women’s Empowerment and Demographics 
1. The contours of the problem 
 Conceptually, the basic strategies for addressing sex disproportion are to ban sex 
selection, to appeal to culture by raising the status of women, and to appeal to economic 
interest by decoupling family income and retirement security from the sex of children.  
The obvious ways of pursuing each strategy turn out to be unsatisfactory because 
relatively ineffectual179.
Begin with prohibition: banning (in order of increasing generality) sex-selective 
abortion, pre-natal sex-identification, or technology that enables that identification 
(regardless of its other uses).  Of course, outright bans on technology such as ultrasound 
 
178 Sen has developed this position in many essays.  See Goods and People, at 509 in Resources, Value, and 
Development, supra n. 66; Markets and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 501 (2003); 
Opportunities and Freedoms, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 583; Freedom and the Evaluation of 
Opportunity, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 659; and passim in AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 
(1999). 
179 At this point, I suspect that morally motivated opponents of abortion will respond that I have tipped my 
ideological hand by ignoring the straightforward alternative of banning all or most abortions.  It is my 
strong impression that, as a purely practical matter, the arguments advanced here about the ineffectiveness 
of bans of particular medical technologies apply a fortiori to bans on procedures that may be performed by 
a variety of technologies.  Although a commitment to both formal and substantive reproductive autonomy 
is among the normative priors of this article, in this instance I think purely practical considerations are 
enough to settle the question.  
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and amniocentesis bring their own costs in forgone medical capacity.  More essentially, 
the effectiveness of prohibition is uncertain at best.  Where the technology is available 
and parents want to use it, the procedures they seek seem to take place.  Maharashtra, the 
state where Bombay lies, banned abortions following sex-determination tests in 1988.180 
The juvenile sex ratio there in 2001, however, stood at 109:100, more lopsided than in the 
majority of Indian states and more pronounced than in Maharashtra in 1991, when many 
juveniles had been born before the ban went into effect.181 The use of ultrasound 
technology for prenatal sex determination is illegal throughout China, which has not yet 
driven down the sex disproportion.182 There is, then, reason to doubt that bans on use of 
medical procedures for sex-selection purposes are effective, at least under present cultural 
and administrative conditions. 
 Changing economic incentives seems to make a difference, but at a high price.  
Experiments in China’s Zhejiang province suggest that instituting old-age pensions can 
indeed reduce the sex disproportion at birth.183 The main difficulty is that, thanks to the 
one-child policy, China’s fertility rate now stands at 1.70 children per woman, compared 
to 4.86 in 1970-75.184 The speed of that demographic contraction significantly outpaces 
even those of Europe and Japan, which 30-40 years ago had much lower fertility rates 
than China’s.  China’s dependency ratio will thus skyrocket in the coming decades, 
regardless of future trends in birthrates.  Moreover, for all its extraordinary economic 
growth, China remains on the whole a poor country, and one plagued by both 
administrative difficulty in tax collection and serious, long-term uncertainty as to its 
 
180 See HUDSON & DE BOER, supra n. 10 at 111. 
181 See id. at 105. 
182 See id. at 246. 
183 See id. at 245-6. 
184 See WORLD POPULATION, supra n.26 at 67. 
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political stability.185 If rich countries face serious questions about sustaining public 
pensions through demographic contraction, the problem holds for China a fortiori.
Besides the raw fiscal difficulty of making a Chinese pension program work, political 
uncertainty would reduce the effect of announced pension benefits on expectant parents.  
Discounting for the possibility of state failure or crisis leading to a change in the policy, 
many would still seek to have sons, to ensure against the disappearance of promised 
benefits. 
 Raising the status of women is both attractive in concept and highly uncertain in 
practice.  The power of state policies to induce cultural change of this sort is uncertain.  
China’s state education system is sex-neutral and has produced near-universal basic 
education for women, but has not reduced the sex disproportion.186 Nor does economic 
development seem to address women’s status automatically, by, for instance, promoting 
egalitarian ideas.  In India, the sex ratios for affluent, educated families are often worse 
than for poorer families.187 Moreover, the low valuation of women feeds back into the 
shaping of economic reality: given lower priority than their brothers, pressed to marry, 
treated as subordinates by their husbands, and regarded as second-rate by employers, 
women will not in fact enjoy the same earning power as men, even when they attain the 
same level of education and are not formally barred from the workplace. 
Nonetheless, the feedback between economics and culture runs in both directions, 
and women who manage to make good on new economic alternatives may be able to 
demand better treatment in their personal lives and incrementally change their cultural 
 
185 For a survey of these problems from a modestly polemical but informed perspective, see GORDON G. 
CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001). 
186 See HUDSON & DE BOER, supra n. 10 at 252.   
187 See id. 
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status.188 The problem is to find the right sequence of changes to set in motion a cycle of 
increasing equality for women.  I address that problem in the next section.189 
2. Women’s substantive freedom: the key to a cycle of reform 
As noted, sex ratios do not necessarily improve with general indicators of 
progress in well-being.  Amartya Sen reports that “variables that relate to the general 
level of development and modernization either turn out to have no statistically significant 
effect, or suggest that modernization … can even strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
gender bias in child survival.”190 Such general indicators of development as urbanization, 
male literacy, the availability of medical facilities, and the level of poverty, either fail to 
mitigate the sex disproportion or intensify it.191 Falling poverty rates, in particular, are 
 
188 In the notes accompanying the next section, I cite a variety of authors, many particularly interested in 
South Asia, who develop this argument.  Within the legal academy, my proposal to understand how distinct 
but intersecting spheres of activity interact in producing or inhibiting substantive freedom owes most to 
Madhavi Sunder.  See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (describing 
women’s empowerment as achieved partly through complementary capacities to dissent or resist coercion 
in both the public and the private spheres); Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001) 
(same). 
189 For China, at least, lifting the one-child policy would seem a straightforward way to reduce the effect of 
preference for sons on the sex ratio of newborns.  The limits of this measure, however, are evident in the 
results of an inadvertent natural experiment: Taiwan, which does not restrict the childbearing decisions of 
its citizens, has a male-female sex ratio of 104.3:100.  See HUDSON & DE BOER, supra n. 10 at 62.  
While significantly better than the figure for mainland China, this number suggests that cultural valuation 
of sons and their superior earning power exercise independent influence on sex selection.  Taiwan has a 
mixed public-private pension system, with mandatory contributions to private schemes, but considerable 
problems with compliance and little allowance for movement from firm to firm or sector to sector by 
workers in the private economy.  Although new reforms promise a more effective system with fewer gaps, 
one cannot say that Taiwan avoids the Chinese economic incentive to have male children as a form of 
retirement insurance.  Taiwan is thus at best a partial control, relative to China, for isolating the influence 
of the cultural preference for sons on sex-selective abortion.  See Shean-Bii Chiu, Taiwan: Compulsory 
Occupational Pensions Still Dominate, Int’l Conference on Pensions in Asia (Feb. 2004)  (discussing gaps 
and inequities in Taiwan’s pension system) (paper on file with author); President Chen’s National Day 
Address (discussing pension reform) (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-
oa/20051010/2005101001.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 
 
190 SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra n. 173 at 197. 
191 See id. 
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sometimes associated with an increase in the sex disproportion.192 (These figures refer to 
the sex ratio in the overall population and in the population surviving early childhood.  I 
say more later about the implications for the sex ratio at birth.) 
None of this is particularly counter-intuitive, given a family preference for sons 
over daughters.  Wealth and medical resources increase power over reproduction.  Male 
literacy means access to information about medical procedures, urbanization means 
proximity to sophisticated medical technology, the prevalence of medical facilities speaks 
for itself, and growing wealth brings the capacity to pay for procedures such as pre-natal 
sex-determination and abortion.  Generally speaking, greater resources will mean greater 
capacity to bring about what a family desires, and millions of family-level decisions will 
register as systemic demographic effects.193 
What is interesting is to disaggregate the family, asking whether the preference 
for sons is common to all members or enforced by husbands, and, if the latter, under what 
conditions women might enforce a contrary preference.  On this point there is 
provocative evidence regarding sex disparities in early-childhood survival.  While 
general indicators of development do not mitigate this disparity, two other variables do 
reduce inequality in children’s survival: women’s literacy and women’s labor force 
participation.194 These are indicators of development; but they are also, specifically, 
indicators of the level at which women have participated in the benefits of development.  
 
192 See id.
193 See ALAKA MALWADE BASU, CULTURE, THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
BEHAVIOUR, ILLUSTRATED WITH THE CASE OF INDIA 227-28 (1992) (arguing that the reason sex 
ratios in childhood survival sometimes worsen with increases in income is the corresponding increase in 
access to relatively high-quality medicine, which families with strong son preference will generally reserve 
for boys). 
194 See id. at 160-81 (surveying and interpreting findings to this effect from India and elsewhere, including 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa). 
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These data suggest that as women gain practical capacity, they enforce a relatively sex-
equitable use of family resources, with great benefits for the survival of female children. 
In making sense of this phenomenon, it is helpful to follow Sen in treating 
families as sites of “cooperative conflict.” 195 In this model, partly congruent and partly 
conflicting individual interests (including values and beliefs, which may of course 
include commitment to the family itself as a unit distinct from the sum of its parts) yield a 
“solution” for the family’s use of resources.  The solution includes both a set of priorities 
and a set of decision-making procedures for setting or balancing priorities.196 A solution 
may be either relatively egalitarian or relatively inegalitarian, both in its 
acknowledgement of the preferences of different family members and in the role it gives 
each family member in setting priorities.197 Applying this model to the issue of 
childhood survival suggests that, while a generic increase in the resources available to the 
family does little to make the solution more sex-egalitarian, an increase in women’s 
 
195 See id. at 192-93.  For a particularly helpful discussion and elaboration of Sen’s model, see BINA 
AGARWAL, A FIELD OF ONE’S OWN: GENDER AND LAND RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA 53-81 
(1994). 
196 See id. 
197 See id. As Agarwal points out, the variables that figure here are not just control of resources, but also 
cultural ideas of which issues are at stake in negotiation and which are so clearly settled as to be off-limits 
to bargaining.  See id. at 73-75.  Another important variable is which conditions women perceive as 
“problems” (whether or not open to negotiation) bearing on their well-being or that of their children, and 
which are accepted (preceding even the question of negotiability) as untroubling.  Sen has emphasized the 
importance of an idea of false consciousness in this connection, suggesting that experience of 
empowerment reveals interests previously obscure to the interest-holder.  See SEN, The Possibility of 
Social Choice, 65, 90-92 in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra n. 173; Martha Nussbaum, Charles 
Taylor: Explanation and Practical Reason, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 232-41 (Nussbaum & Sen, eds.) 
(1993).  Others have argued that the poor are always in some measure aware of their disadvantage, and 
simply require practical opportunities, not enhanced insight, to challenge it.  See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, 
WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985).  Although I 
tend to follow Sen and Nussbaum in believing that exposure to new experiences and ideas can revise one’s 
estimation of one’s interests – and that to believe the contrary would be more condescending than even a 
crude “false consciousness” view – the present argument does not require a judgment on this point.  
Increased capacity, or substantive freedom, is open to interpretation as either a source of insight into one’s 
interests or an instrument for pursuing and enforcing interests already recognized.  On reasons to believe 
that self-understanding frames any negotiating process, see CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE HUMAN SCIENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAERS 2 at 34-37 (arguing for the place of self-
understanding in constituting activity such as politics or negotiation) (1985). 
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capacities enables them to enforce egalitarian solutions.  How far literacy and access to 
work increase the standing, self-confidence, or other factors of “voice” within the family, 
and how far they rather change negotiating positions by creating an “exit” option into an 
alternative life is unclear, but some combination of effects is intuitive.198 What seems 
clear, however, is that when they can, women tend to enforce a use of family resources 
that supports the survival of girls as well as boys. 
It does not follow from this that women’s empowerment also diminishes sex-
selective abortion.   That would depend foremost on why women insist on sex-equitable 
solutions within the family: for reasons of sex egalitarianism or out of love for existing 
children.  Mitigation of sex disparities in childhood survival rates might reflect 
indiscriminate love for children once born, meaning mothers would stick up for their 
living daughters, but not refuse sex-selective abortions.  Alternatively, sex-neutral 
maternal concern might extend to potential children.  As a third possibility, empowered 
mothers might be resisting the valuation of male over female lives in general.  If either 
the second or third alternative explained a significant share of the improvement of girls’ 
survival rates where women are empowered, then women’s increased capacities should 
also translate into successful resistance to sex-selective abortion, and thus to improved 
sex ratios at birth. 
 Moreover, it would be artificial to imagine that the motives women bring to bear 
on reproductive decisions are constant, changing only as women’s capacity to effect their 
 
198 The reference, of course, is to ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).    For his part, Sen notes “considerable evidence 
than when women can and do earn income outside the household, this tends to enhance the relative position 
of women in the distributions within the household.”  SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra n.
173 at 194.  He also suggests that literacy and education make women aware of alternatives and give them 
some confidence in insisting on the legitimacy of their desires.  Id. at 198-99.  The phenomenology of these 
suggestions is of mixed voice and exit, which seems right.  
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aims waxes and wanes.  In fact, economic power and cultural status are intuitively 
connected here.  An increase in women’s capacity will bring new experiences that, in 
turn, all but ensure new priorities for both women and men.199 Where women work 
outside the home and can read, the result is a different set of everyday interactions, 
expectations, and experiences of capacity, all redounding to women’s sense of agency in 
general and to the goals and priorities they set.200 
3. Fertility and women’s substantive freedom 
In wealthy, broadly liberal settings such as Europe (and to a lesser degree Japan 
and South Korea), the basic substantive freedoms that count so much for women’s well-
being in poor countries are secure.  The relevant question is not whether women are 
substantively free (i.e., are in fact able) to enter the workforce and to influence family 
decisions about resources and reproduction.  More significant is the structure of the 
tradeoffs women and families confront in making the decisions that shape a personal life 
 
199 See supra n. 191 (discussing Sen, Nussbaum, Taylor on this issue).  This is a kind of moral-
psychological corollary of the growing recognition that women’s agency is a critical factor in economic and 
social development, not merely in the passive sense that it makes women bearers of greater quanta of well-
being, but in the active sense that women’s empowerment contributes to development processes that affect 
both women and men.  This thesis is the thrust of the discussion in SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS 
FREEDOM, supra n. 173 at 189-203.  For a recent summation of arguments and data supporting this view, 
see Isobel Coleman, The Payoff from Women’s Rights, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May – June 2004) 
(“Educated women have fewer children; provide better nutrition, health, and education to their families; 
experience significantly lower child mortality; and generate more income than women with little or no 
schooling.  Investing to educate them thus creates a virtuous cycle for their community”). 
200 See AGARWAL, supra n. 189 at 421-66 (describing in several case-studies as well as theoretically how 
struggles over resources are also “struggles over meanings,” that is, over what women’s and men’s interests 
are and how they should count.  “Struggles” should be underscored: women’s increasing control of 
resources has often resulted in both violence and a recrudescence of male-supremacist politics.  See id. at 
271-76 (describing such reactions).  The view that changes in economic structure and opportunity and 
changes in individual values go hand in hand appears to find confirmation also in the decline in native-born 
white American fertility rates around the beginning of the nineteenth century, which prompted pro-natalist 
warnings of “race suicide.”  Summarizing historians’ views of that period, Linda Gordon concludes, “The 
economic reorganization that made smaller families more economical also made upper- and middle-class 
women eager for broader horizons, which in turn made them desire smaller families.”  See GORDON, 
supra n. 141 at 100-01.  
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and a career: whether to enter a reproductive partnership, whether to have a first child, 
whether to have a second or third child, whether to enter and remain in a career, whether 
to leave the workforce.  While there may be neither formal nor significant practical 
barriers to a woman’s making any one of the decisions just listed, the opportunity cost of 
each may be such that certain combinations of choices are effectively impossible.  If rich 
and poor alike are free to sleep under the bridges of Paris, so, too, are women free to leap 
those bridges in a single bound, with a child on one hip and a briefcase on the other.  
How many will be able to do so is another question. 
It is, moreover, a question that public policy can influence.  As noted, Philip 
Longman has argued that the cost to a middle-class American family of raising a child 
through age 17 is about one million dollars, the lion’s share in forgone wages by one 
parent.201 Longman’s contention is that American families would prefer to have more 
children than they in fact do, but are deterred by the cost of childrearing.202 Thirty-eight 
percent of French women report that three children is the ideal number for a family, but 
fewer than 15 percent have that number.203 As noted, German poll results suggest a 
preference for family size below the replacement rate; but this preference may in part 
reflect recognition of the costs of childrearing.204 
These figures suggest that public policy increases the substantive freedom of 
women and families when it reduces the opportunity costs of bearing and rearing children 
in terms of workplace participation, and vice-versa.  An increase in substantive freedom 
 
201 See LONGMAN, supra n. 35 at 73 (summarizing his argument and cost estimates). 
202 See id. at 81-85 (reporting that United States women and families express a wish for more children than 
they in fact have). 
203 See Hugh Schofield, Joy for France as Population Goes Boum, SUNDAY HERALD (Sept. 25, 2005), 
available at http://www.sundayherald.com/print51878 (last accessed Sept. 29, 2005). 
204 See supra n. 38. 
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along these dimensions, other things equal, will mean increasing the number of children 
families have by reducing the marginal cost of each.  Put differently, the goal would be 
reconciliation of two kinds of choices: the choice to bear children and the choice to work.  
Reconciliation has been the goal of French family-support policy since 1994, and it has 
come along with an increase in the country’s fertility rate in recent years, after three 
decades of decline.205 Moreover, France’s fertility rate has passed 1.9, making it the 
highest in the European Union (tied with Ireland) and significantly higher than those just 
below it, Luxembourg (1.78) and Finland (1.73).206 The country’s fertility rate is high 
despite the fact that France has one of the EU’s highest rates of two-earner families, with 
70 percent of those including two full-time workers.207 Eighty-one percent of women 
with one child and sixty-nine percent of women with two children are in the 
workforce.208 These figures suggest that France’s goal of reconciliation has found some 
success. 
Several kinds of transfers, targeted subsidies, and state-provided services work to 
reduce the cost of French children to their parents.  Direct per-child payments (beginning 
once a family has two children) set a baseline, with both payments and tax breaks rising 
further for families with three or more children.209 Paid maternity and paternity leave 
policies rise to a three-year income entitlement for mothers (and occasionally fathers) of 
a third child who opt to leave work for that period.210 Most significant for the goal of 
 
205 See Marie-Therese Letablier, Fertility and Family Policies in France (unpublished manuscript of Centre 
d’Etudes de l’Emploi, Paris, on file with author) at 1. 
206 See id. The most recent report is of a rate approaching 1.92.  See Hugh Schofield, Joy for France as 
Population Goes Boum, SUNDAY HERALD (Sept. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.sundayherald.com/print51878 (last accessed Sept. 29, 2005). 
207 See id. at 12.   
208 See Letablier at 11. 
209 See Letablier, supra n. 199 at 2-6; Schofield, supra n. 200. 
210 See Letablier, supra n. 199 at 6-7; Schofield, supra n. 200. 
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reconciliation is an extensive scheme of child care, including state-financed nurseries for 
children under three, schools beginning at age 3, and tax-breaks and subsides for in-home 
child-care.211 The effect is to reduce a panoply of childrearing costs: the danger of losing 
one’s job, the direct cost of care, and the income loss from forgone employment.  The 
ultimate goal is to soften the often stark choice between bearing and raising children and 
remaining employed. 
It is instructive to contrast the French experience with those of other European 
countries.  Indeed, Europe presents a laboratory of federalist experimentation with 
fertility policy.  Spain, which since the end of Franco’s fascist regime has pursued a 
passive policy that relies on families to make reproductive decisions and to care for their 
own children, has gone from having Europe’s second-highest fertility rate in 1971 to one 
of its lowest today.212 Germany provides relatively generous welfare-state support, but 
until recently has offered little in the way of subsidized care for the pre-school children of 
working mothers, and gives significantly shorter maternity leaves (at 14 weeks) than 
France.213 The country’s overall family-support policy, while it consumes 2.7 percent of 
GDP, consists of pocketbook transfers that create no meaningful infrastructure to reduce 
the burdens of child care and directly reconcile work and family.214 German fertility 
 
211 See Letablier, supra n. 199 at 7-13, Schofield, supra n.200. 
212 See Grant, supra n. 14 at137.  As with all such comparisons in Europe, there are confounding variables.  
Spain has experienced persistent unemployment among young people, which has probably interacted with a 
relatively new sexual libertarianism to delay childbearing or to inhibit it for reasons partly independent of 
state policy.  See David C. Unger, An Immigration Experiment Worth Watching in Spain, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 20, 2005) (noting a persistent Spanish unemployment rate around 10 percent); Surkyn & Ron 
Lesthaeghe, supra n. 35 (noting the timing of Spain’s adoption of post-traditional values). 
213 See Grant, supra n. 14 at 95 (noting additionally that only 5 percent of pre-school children of working 
mothers received subsidized child care). 
214 See Kinder, Gentler, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 6, 2003) (describing child-care facilities as “poor or 
non-existent” in the West German welfare state and noting that childrearing “has traditionally been 
considered a private not a public matter” in Germany). 
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rates remain much lower than France’s, as the high opportunity cost of childbearing 
presses the average age of mothers at first birth to nearly 30.215 
The Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden and Norway, follow a family-
support policy much nearer France’s, emphasizing reconciliation of work and family.  
They enjoy commensurately higher fertility rates.  Norway guarantees 44 weeks of paid 
maternity leave, about three-fifths as much paid paternity leave, and an option of either 
tacking on a year’s unpaid leave or accepting substantial, income-scaled subsidies for 
child care.216 Sweden provides 390 days of paid leave, which parents can divide as they 
wish (except for sixty days set aside for the secondary care-giver, a gesture toward 
gender equity).217 Public childcare, which in Scandinavia has always aimed at 
reconciling work and family on ground of gender equity, enables about two-thirds of 
Swedish mothers with young children to work outside the home.218 A remarkable feature 
of Swedish demography is that fertility is “pro-cyclical,” that is, positively related to 
women’s earnings and employment levels, suggesting that Sweden’s policies of 
reconciliation have substantially reduced the tradeoff between women’s equal economic 
participation and childbearing.219 
That such policies are costly hardly needs remarking.  Crudely put, they are 
subsidies for the production of a valuable resource: replacements for the present 
 
215 See id. 
216 See Marit Ronsen, Fertility and Public Policy: Evidence from Noway and Finland, 10 DEMOGRAPHIC 
RESEARCH Art. 6, 146-47 (2003).  Ronsen’s longitudinal study of Norway and Finland did not find 
expansion of public child care correlated with an increase in fertility, but, as Ronsen noted, this unexpected 
and counter-intuitive finding likely reflects the fact that child care emerged at a time of increasing female 
participation in the workforce, and thus interacted with a growing commitment to work and increased 
opportunity costs in child-bearing.  The relevant question, is the difficult counter-factual of what would 
have happened had women entered the workforce in large numbers without the benefit of public child care 
– specifically, whether fertility might have fallen to something nearer German levels. 
217 See Grant, supra n.14 at 124. 
218 See id. at 125. 
219 See id. at 130. 
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generation of workers and taxpayers.  Regarded as a subsidy they are open to plausible 
justification: parents absorb much of the cost, and all the employment-based opportunity 
cost, of their children, while reaping only a tiny and diffuse share of their children’s later 
contribution to the economy.220 The massive positive externalities of children are 
sufficient reason to encourage their production. 
A complementary rationale is the increase in women’s substantive freedom which 
reconciliation policies produce.  This freedom is valuable not just because it induces 
higher fertility rates, but also as a social goal in itself.  In developing countries, increases 
in substantive freedom press fertility rates downward as women exercise newfound 
agency to resist pro-natal norms that have long been enforced coercively, either directly 
or by lack of meaningful alternatives.221 In wealthy countries, however, the effect may 
be the opposite: with expanded sets of viable choices, women and families are 
particularly interested in reconciling several kinds of goods, such as career and 
childrearing.  There, an increase in substantive freedom will mean an increase in fertility 
rates over present levels, which partly reflect the costly tradeoffs of choosing to have 
children.  A society with greater substantive freedom to reconcile such complementary 
goals is a freer society. 
As noted earlier, such policies may not increase fertility to the replacement rate in 
many rich societies.  Estimates of the elasticity of parents’ decision to bear children even 
in France suggest as much – although one must bear in mind that such indifference 
 
220 Longman analysis 
221 For a discussion of the remarkable effect on fertility rates of the indicia of women’s substantive 
freedom, particularly labor market participation and literacy, see SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, 
supra n. 173 at 198-99. 
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curves are artifacts of personality and culture, not natural kinds.222 Replacement-level 
fertility, however, need not be the standard of success.  Policies that can mitigate the 
effects of fertility decline while increasing substantive freedom are desirable in both 
respects, even if they cannot carry the whole weight of the task. 
 
VI. Women, politics, and extremism 
The falling fertility rates of rich countries and the rising sex disproportion of poor 
countries both conjure up alarming political associations.  In Europe, particularly, 
perceptions of demographic decline are historically associated with reactionary and 
authoritarian politics.  In India and China, as elsewhere, large populations of unmarried 
young men are ideal recruitment targets for ultra-nationalists and other extremist 
movements.  In the last Part, I argued that increases in women’s substantive freedoms can 
mitigate the two demographic crises, and thus also diminish their consequences.  Here, I 
present tantalizing evidence that women’s substantive freedoms may also have a direct 
effect on politics, tending to make extremism and authoritarianism less potent.  If this is 
true, than women’s empowerment is an apt response to the demographic crises on both 
the level of demography and the level of politics. 
 
A. Women’s Empowerment and Democracy: A First Pass 
 
222 Researchers estimate the elasticity level of demand for children in France to be .2, suggesting that 
fiscally viable subsidies can press toward fertility upward, but not to replacement level.  See Guy Laroque 
& Bernard Calanie, Does Fertility Respond to Financial Incentives? at 35-36 (unpublished paper, on file 
with author). 
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One of the most provocative forays into this issue is by political scientist M. 
Steven Fish.223 Fish was drawn to the question of why predominantly Islamic countries 
are less democratic than others, even correcting for levels of economic development 
(widely acknowledged to correspond to democratic governance).224 Dissatisfied with the 
generalization that Islam is culturally hostile to democracy in some ill-specified way, 
Fish introduced a new independent variable: the subordination of women, as measured by 
women’s literacy, sex ratios in the living population, and the percentage of high 
government posts occupied by women.225 The preceding discussion suggests that the 
first two are particularly apt indicators, as literacy affects women’s agency in family and 
social life and sex ratios express women’s agency or lack of it.  Taking as dependent 
variable the numerical assessment of democratic governance assigned each country in the 
world by the governance-monitoring organization Freedom House, Fish found that each 
of his indicators of women’s subordination significantly reduced the explanatory power 
of a country’s predominantly Islamic or non-Islamic population makeup.226 Fish offered 
several provisional theoretical speculations about the causal story behind these findings.  
Perhaps male domination in family and social life sows authoritarian habits of arbitrary 
power in some, craven subordination in others, and diminishes the expectation that power 
in general should be answerable to either egalitarian principles or demands for reason-
giving.227 Perhaps the integration of women into a variety of social, economic, and 
 
223 See M. Steven Fish, Islam and Authoritarianism, WORLD POLITICS 55 at 4-37 (October 2002). 
224 See id. at 13-14 (the link between Islam and authoritarianism “is too stark and robust to ignore, neglect, 
or dismiss”). 
225 See id. at 24-28. 
226 See Fish, supra n. 217 at 25-29. 
227 See id. at 30-31.  I pursue this point further in my discussion of the recent work of political scientist 
Karen Stenner on authoritarianism and family structure.  See VI.B, below.  This view finds support from 
some commentators within the Muslim world.  See ABDELLAH HAMMOUDI, MASTER AND 
DISCIPLE: THE CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF MOROCCAN AUTHORITARIANISM 44-143 
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political contexts induces different, less authoritarian behavior in the men of those 
contexts.228 Perhaps, for whatever reasons, women tend to hold attitudes less conducive 
to authoritarianism than men’s, such as weaker tastes for domination and hierarchy or a 
preference for cooperative or consensual problem-solving.229 
This is not the place to attempt an assessment of these competing but potentially 
complementary explanations.  For my part, I am intensely skeptical of arguments that 
suppose any “essential” social or political attitudes inherent in men or women, and 
reflexively friendly toward arguments that emphasize the variation in potential attitudes 
within both sexes, depending on institutional and cultural context.230 My own 
 
(1997) (arguing for a causal connection between patterns of interpersonal domination and submission and 
political authoritarianism); HISHAM SHARABI, NEOPATRIARCHY: A THEORY OF DISTORTED 
CHANGE IN ARAB SOCIETY 26-60 (1988) (arguing in a similar vein). 
228 See Fish, supra n. 217 at 30-31.  This model would depend on the social-psychological effects of 
negotiation and bargaining.  For a discussion of recent research in the social psychology of reciprocity, 
with particular attention to its relevance to legal questions, see Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: 
Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003).  Brain researchers have also found that 
areas of the brain associated with emotions and social engagement are activated in individuals who show 
high levels of trust and reciprocity, potentially suggesting that training in reciprocal negotiation induces 
motivation to further reciprocity.  See James K. Rilling, et al. A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 
NEURON (Issue 2) 395-405 (2002); Kevin McCabe et al., A functional imaging study of cooperation in two-
person reciprocal exchange, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. (No. 20) 11832-35 (Sept. 25, 2001).  I discuss the 
historical development of the moral psychology of reciprocity as an idea in political economy and law in 
Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1253-58 (2005). 
229 See Fish, supra n. 217 at 30-31.  This view is associated with “difference feminism,” the position that 
women tend to a distinct and characteristic set of values and attitudes that are salutary in social and political 
life.  A classic statement of this view is Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self 
and Morality, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 481 (1977) (criticizing Lawrence Kohlberg’s account of moral 
learning, with its emphasis on application of abstract principle, as insufficiently relational and contextual, 
and identifying women’s perspectives with the latter qualities).  For a psychoanalytically informed version 
of a similar perspective, see NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 173-219 (1978) (arguing for a relationship 
between deeply embedded gender characteristics reproduced through parent-child relations and the social 
and institutional structure of liberal capitalism).  
230 This emphasis partly reflects an interest throughout my work in how attitudes toward politics, sex, race, 
human equality or inequality, and so forth vary from time to time and place to place, and how institutional 
change can induce changes in attitudes, or at least clear space in which such changes can occur.  I think any 
awareness of the variety of human experience of sex and gender makes confident generalization in an 
essentialist vein almost impossible to sustain.  My emphasis on contingent aspects of sex and gender also 
reflects a political choice: so long as we cannot know what is fixed and what mutable, an interest in how 
non-coercive institutions can open space for free exploration of mutability, particularly in newly egalitarian 
sex relations, seems to me an appropriately experimental and open-ended attitude. 
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discussions in this Part reflect that emphasis, treating women as agents and bearers of 
interests inflected by revisable self-conceptions, rather than as vectors of essentially 
”feminine” values or social modes. 
In this sub-part, I offer one specific suggestion about the significance socially and 
politically empowered women for the kinds of nationalist and other extremist politics 
whose appeal is the special political concern of this article.  Today, the ideological appeal 
of such nationalism almost always involves a reaction to women’s increased social 
participation and power within the family, and a proposal to restore “traditional” 
relations.  This attitude holds for the Shiv Sena and other Hindu nationalists,231 Islamists, 
232and smaller-scale reactionary movements that revive such customs as belief in and 
persecution of witches as a way of constraining empowered women.233 To the extent that 
women have become invested in both their new capabilities and an expanded view of 
their interests and potential agency, they might well experience contemporary nationalist 
movements as a direct threat.  This interpretation avoids essentialist speculation about 
women’s intrinsic attitudes toward hierarchy or the effect of feminine presence on 
institutional culture.  Instead, this interpretation focuses on the concrete fact that most 
contemporary nationalism and related extremism presents a threat to the status and 
 
231 For a discussion of this dynamic in Sena ideology, see ECKERT, supra n. 114 at 140-47 (reporting that 
Sena members frequently identify themselves as defenders of the honor of their nation’s women and 
against the alleged threats to purity of ethnic mixing).  On the trope of Hindu nationalism as the assertion of 
a masculine principle, see Brian K. Smith, Re-envisioning Hinduism and Evaluating the Hindutva 
Movement, 26 RELIGION 119, 120-23 (1996).   
232 On the persistent appearance of women’s status and free activity as a spur to Islamist affiliation, see,
e.g.., Blind Faith, available at http://www.smh.com/news/world/blind-faith/2005/08/26 (substantiating 
through reportage on the political and theological affiliations of the July 7 London bombers “the jihadist 
obsession with purity amidst the perceived corruption of the West”).  Many commentators have remarked 
on the same quality in the Islamist abhorrence of the West.  See, e.g., Jonathan Raban, My Holy War, THE 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2002, at 28 (noting the gynophobia and “sense of extreme moral precariousness” 
in connection with women of the founding Islamist Sayyid Qutb). 
233 See AGARWAL, supra n. 189 at 271-76 (describing such episodes in Indian villages as responses to 
women’s increased control of resources). 
72
participation that increase women’s power to control resources, exercise power within the 
family, and influence reproductive decisions. 
This interpretation is quite plausible in Europe, and may help to explain why 
declining fertility has not produced a meaningful upsurge in support for nationalist 
agendas there.   It is not that there has been no effort to yoke such agendas to concern 
about falling population.  On the contrary, France’s far-right National Front has linked 
demographic alarms to attacks on abortion rights and calls for restoring women’s 
traditional roles as mothers and housewives.234 This classic expression of reactionary 
pro-natalism, however, has found little traction in contemporary France, where women’s 
integration into political and economic life has shifted even mainstream pro-natalist 
positions from a first-generation emphasis on children as social resources to solicitude for 
women’s autonomy that falls much nearer the spirit of the second-generation 
commitment to autonomy.  As Marie-Therese Letablier notes, twentieth-century French 
family policy rested originally on “the idea that children were a collective investment,” 
and thus “[m]others of numerous children were rewarded for being ‘good citizens’ by 
giving children to the Nation.”235 In recent decades, however, this sex-specific idea of 
citizenship, in which women’s civic role is substantially identical with their biological 
function, has given way to a relatively gender-equitable concern with women’s capacity 
to reconcile family and work commitments.236 This reconciliation-oriented approach is 
compatible with recognizing that there is a collective interest in the aggregate results of 
individual reproductive decisions; in this respect, it comes to grips with contemporary 
 
234 On the intersection of the National Front’s anti-immigration stance and its concern with the decline in 
“authentically French” births, see Carolyn Sargent, Counseling Contraception for Malian Immigrants in 
Paris: Blobal, State, and Personal Politics, HUMAN ORG. at 147 (July 1, 2005).   
235 Letablier, supra n. 199 at 2. 
236 See id. at 11-14 (outlining this shift). 
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demographic problems.  The reconciliation-oriented approach, however, is not 
compatible with the historical impulse of pro-natalist politics: coercion in reproductive 
decisions and insistence on a return to traditional sex and gender roles.  It makes room to 
acknowledge the social interest in reproductive decisions, but bounds that interest by 
principles of autonomy and gender equity. 
This analysis gives cause for guarded optimism.  It suggests that some kinds of 
progress are hard to reverse – specifically, that once women are integrated into political 
and economic life on relatively equitable terms, their commitment to their own 
substantive freedoms will constrain the potential scope of reactionary politics.237 In this 
respect, at least, history may not be prologue: past episodes of reactionary pro-natalism 
occurred in times and places where women were much more economically and politically 
vulnerable than in Europe today.  Conversely, if political commitments to women’s 
substantive freedoms are fairly stable, this means that acknowledging demographic 
concerns in politics and policy may not be worrisome as it has sometimes seemed in a 
period haunted by the ugly memory of first-generation biopolitics. 
This hopeful point, however, leaves open two major reasons for concern.  One is 
that women’s gains in substantive freedom may remain quite vulnerable outside Europe, 
both in Japan and Korea, where fertility is well below replacement rate, and in countries 
where the demographic problem is sex disproportion.  Because women’s substantive 
freedoms are both the best means to address the demographic problems themselves and, 
 
237 Of course, a commitment to a mutable and contingent idea of the political behavior of the sexes leaves 
open the possibility that empowered women will behave in ways that undermine what I am calling their 
substantive freedom – for instance, by supporting political programs that urge a return to hearth and 
kitchen, or by opposing formal reproductive rights.  I can only respond that, as a rule of thumb, those who 
stand to lose resources or alternatives from a political program are somewhat less likely to sign on than 
those who do not: I am essentialist enough about human rationality to accept this description as capturing a 
widespread tendency, albeit one that ideological, psychological, religious, or other appeals can sometimes 
overcome.  
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maybe, a check on the extremist politics that otherwise tend to accompany both 
demographic crises, their fragility is worrisome.  Second, even assuming that women’s 
substantive freedoms are good checks against reactionary pro-natalist politics, there is 
less reason to believe they would similarly check the nativist and racist politics that might 
accompany a large increase in the number of immigrants to Europe or East Asia. 
 
B. Family dynamics and authoritarianism 
As noted in the last sub-part, I am sympathetic to hypotheses about the 
relationship between’s women’s empowerment and politics that avoid speculation about 
the “essential” attitudes of men and women and instead look to the interaction of 
institutions, practices, and values in shaping gender roles and gendered self-conceptions.  
An intriguing body of recent research that might illuminate the relationship between 
family structure and authoritarianism glimpsed in the last sub-part is that of political 
scientist Karen Stenner.238 Stenner’s work is worth engaging here for two reasons.  First, 
she has single-handedly revivified what had been a moribund social-science response to 
an urgent question: why some individuals are attracted to authoritarian political 
movements and others not – a question with large and straightforward application to this 
article’s concerns about the future of liberal and democratic political values.239 Second, 
 
238 See KAREN STENNER, THE AUTHORITARIAN DYNAMIC (2005). 
239 In the formal social-science literature, this question got seriously underway with the publication of The 
Authoritarian Personality in 1950.  See T.W. ADORNO, et al., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 
(1950).  Sponsored and copyrighted by the American Jewish Committee, this massive study was a direct 
response to the arresting fact that Nazism had some to power in an educated, democratic, and, it would 
have seemed, relatively liberal society.  The motive to make sense of the fascist appeal through social 
psychology, however, went back at least to Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom, published early in the 
Second World War.  See ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941).  Subsequently, Robert 
Jay Lifton pursued Fromm’s and Adorno’s psychoanalytic approach to the problem, asking how the 
apocalyptic political impulse arises, persuading adherents that a climactic act of violence can make the 
world whole and pure.  See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, DESTROYING THE WORLD TO SAVE IT:AUM 
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Stenner’s response to the methodological problems that had led this line of inquiry to an 
impasse turns on a connection between normative ideas of the family and susceptibility to 
authoritarian appeals in politics.240 Although Stenner does not develop her argument in 
this direction, her research suggests that the degree of reciprocity in family 
decisionmaking may train people to expect greater or lesser degrees of reciprocity, and 
thus of persuasion and negotiation rather than authoritarian command, in social and 
political life generally.241 I begin with the contribution of Stenner’s work to the 
methodology of authoritarian studies, then connect her work with the argument of this 
Part. 
 Of all the questions one might want social science to answer, one of the most 
consequential is why authoritarian politics succeeds or fails.  Authoritarian movements 
and governments have been the bane of democracies throughout the twentieth century, 
from Nazism to today’s radical Hindu and Islamist politics: wherever they come to power 
through elections, indeed wherever they attract popular support, they imply that 
democracy may be self-undermining, at least under certain circumstances.  Since 
Theodor Adorno and his collaborators began trying to understand variation in individual 
attraction to fascism in Nazi Germany, students of authoritarian disposition have broadly 
agreed on the types of political attitudes they seek to understand: “suppression of [moral, 
 
SHINRIKYO, APOCALYTPIC VIOLENCE, AND THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM (1999).  
Departing sharply from the psychodynamic approach, Canadian political psychologist Bob Altemeyer has 
described authoritarian attitudes as a product of “social learning,” a package of attitudes acquired and 
reinforced in one’s social setting rather than related to any predisposition firmly established in early life.  
See BOB ALTEMEYER, ENEMIES OF FREEDOM: UNDERSTANDING RIGHT-WING 
AUTHORITARIANISM (1988).  Others have stayed with the idea of strong predispositions, but looked to 
biological rather than social bases for these.  See C.S. Bergeman, et al., Genetic and Environmental Effects 
on Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness: An Adoption/Twin Study,” 61 J. OF 
PERSONALITY 159 (1993).  
240 See STENNER, supra n. 230 at 23-25 (laying out her approach). 
241 This sketch of possible lines of causation lines up with the “reciprocity” hypothesis about the connection 
between women’s empowerment and political freedom that I discuss in n. 228, supra, and accompanying 
text. 
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cultural, and/or racial] difference and insistence upon uniformity,” expressed in politics 
through “autocratic social arrangements in which individual autonomy yields to group 
authority.”242 These attitudes characterized fascist and nationalist movements in the early 
and middle decades of the twentieth century, and they characterize today’s forms of 
extremism as well.243 
Yet the distinctness of the problem has not inspired methodological lucidity.  
Instead, several persistent problems led to the neglect and eclipse of the study of 
authoritarian disposition.  First was a confusion of independent and dependent variables: 
the entanglement of the supposed object of the study – a disposition to authoritarian 
appeals – with its ostensible expression, adherence to authoritarian political beliefs.244 
Students of authoritarianism have identified bearers of authoritarian disposition by 
measuring expression of authoritarian beliefs, effectively collapsing the distinction 
between disposition and authoritarianism itself, and thus producing a circular definition 
of the authoritarian disposition: the disposition evidenced by expression of the very 
authoritarian beliefs that the disposition was meant to explain.245 Second was a related 
conceptual failure: the conflation of “authoritarian” attitudes with the political program of 
“right-wing” parties in the home countries of the investigators, so that “authoritarianism” 
gets run together with the conservative distaste for change and disruption in general, and 
 
242 See id. at 15.  Stenner elsewhere elaborates on her findings in connection with this model: 
“authoritarians proved to be greatly alarmed by departures from moral and cultural absolutism, by any 
deviation from unquestioning conformity to external authority.  And most characteristic of all, they 
invariably looked first to leaders and institutions to reinstate and reinforce the normative order, seeking to 
marshal the authority of the state to ‘institute’ the maintenance of ‘civility’ and ‘hold up our moral 
values[.]’  Id. at 267.  
243II.C, supra.
244 See STENNER, supra n. 230 at 20-23 (outlining this problem). 
245 See R. Nevitt Sanford, et al, The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends, in ADORNO, et al., 
supra n. 231 at 222-279 (explaining the method of measuring the authoritarian personality, the now-
notorious “F Scale”).  Altemeyer’s “Right-Wing Authoritarianism” suffers from the same difficulty.  See 
ALTEMEYER, supra n. 231. 
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with the libertarian preference for free markets over directive or redistributive social 
polcy.246 Third, besides failing to generate a tractable definition of the authoritarian 
disposition that does not collapse into a description of current politics – and mostly local 
politics, at that – theorists have mostly lacked any account of what brings the disposition 
into action in political life: Why, if such a disposition exists, do authoritarian appeals fall 
on deaf ears in some places and times and gather followers in others?247 
Stenner’s response is to isolate a relatively non-partisan definition of 
“authoritarian” disposition, distinct from conservative and libertarian outlooks, which 
does not depend on the same political attitudes that it is supposed to predict.  She uses 
this definition to develop a testable theory of why the authoritarian disposition manifests 
itself in intolerant political attitudes in some contexts, but not in others.  Stenner 
identifies authoritarianism with “some general desire … to transfer sovereignty to, and 
commit self and others to conformity with some collective order,” that is, a deep-set 
belief that the security and trustworthiness of the social world depend on “collective 
authority and conformity … oneness and sameness.”248 On Stenner’s account, this 
disposition finds expression under circumstances of “normative threat,” when the 
“collective order” is threatened by conflicting values, “moral decay,” or evidence that 
political leaders are unreliable.249 Thus in times of apparent stability and normative 
agreement, authoritarians’ views may not differ sharply from those of others.  When 
 
246 See STENNER, supra n. 230 at 138-98 (comparing authoritarian with conservative dispositions), 236-68 
(comparing authoritarian with libertarian dispositions).  This confusion has the methodologically unsettling 
consequence that, for instance, Russian communists who abhor the chaos of quasi-democratic capitalism 
score high on a “right-wing authoritarianism” measure that includes a preference for libertarian economic 
policies as part of its definition of authoritarianism.  See id. at 149-50 (reporting and commenting on this 
“finding” by Altemeyer). 
247 See STENNER, supra n. 230 at 17-20 (outlining this difficulty and a response). 
248 Id. at 141. 
249 See id. at 11-12, 26-29 (describing features of her theory of normative threat). 
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events conspire to present “normative threat,” however, authoritarians will respond with 
more conformist and punitive positions than non-authoritarians, and will make a high 
priority of reconstituting a stable and trustworthy authority.250 By contrast, libertarians 
are much less likely to express increasingly authoritarian views even under conditions of 
normative threat.251 Conservatives, while resistant to change and often to disagreement, 
tend to be hostile to the drastic programs that most distinctively characterize authoritarian 
politics: efforts to reconstitute authority in the face of perceived breakdown, which 
various forms of nationalism and fascism exemplify.252 
Stenner ties this abstract account of authoritarian disposition to a set of non-
political attitudes that, she hypothesizes, should predict the disposition: normative ideas 
of the family and of the kind of adult personality that childrearing aims to produce.  She 
identifies those attitudes through responses to questions designed to probe childrearing 
values, chiefly by asking respondents to rank as more important one of a pair of qualities 
that parents might seek to inculcate in their children.253 The pairings are on the model of 
the following alternative goals: “that [the child] follows the rules” or “that he follows his 
own conscience,” and “that he has respect for his elders” or “that he thinks for 
himself.”254 In Stenner’s account, such questions effectively and unobtrusively elicit 
basic orientations toward the relative value and importance of authority and uniformity 
versus autonomy and diversity; moreover, they do so in a setting with high stakes for the 
 
250 See id. at 26-29, 85-98 (outlining authoritarian responses to normative threat and contrasting these with 
conservative responses). 
251 See id. at 261-68 (describing libertarian subjects as resistant to the idea that social phenomena that 
constitute normative threat for authoritarians are in fact evidence of “moral decay”). 
252 See id. at 85-98.  Stenner gives the telling example of Britain, where intolerance gets much support from 
authoritarianism, but little from conservatism, because the country’s tolerant traditions make dispositional 
conservatism an ally of toleration. 
253 See id. at 23-25. 
254 Id. at 24. 
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respondents – the raising of children.255 There is thus reason to believe that the answers 
should capture genuine, deep-set attitudes.256 And, in fact, Stenner has found that high 
scores on her childrearing-based authoritarianism index correspond to heightened levels 
of authoritarian attitudes under conditions of normative threat, suggesting that the index 
captures the disposition she hypothesizes.257 
It is critical to Stenner’s methodological contribution that she treat her index of 
childrearing values as an independent variable.  I suspect that is why does not advance 
the extension of her research that I am about to suggest.  Her work is most interesting 
when one keeps in mind that normative conceptions of the family and the adult 
personality that childrearing should produce are not natural facts.  Rather, they emerge 
from ideological and material contests: on the one hand, contests of ideas about what 
defines a good or just family and a good or dignified person; on the other hand, contests 
over control of resources, which structure the “cooperative competition” within families.  
Both kinds of contests contribute to each succeeding generation’s idea of what families 
should be.258 Vivid examples, such as the relative increase in girls’ survival through 
infancy when their mothers become literate and join the workforce, suggest that the 
family becomes a very different thing, normatively and practically, as the social world of 
values and resources changes around it.259 So far as the resulting normative idea of the 
family serves as a proxy for authoritarian disposition, changes in the direction of gender 
 
255 See id. at 24-25. 
256 It strikes me as a fair concern that there is indeed a politics of parenting, and people’s ideological and 
partisan affiliations may well influence their announced priorities in raising children.  A glance at the 
cultural politics of the Christian Right in the United States will confirm this point.  That said, however, 
precisely because childrearing is intimate and has substantial and immediate consequences, Stenner’s 
judgment that it provides a relatively independent clue to basic orientations is plausible.  Moreover, her 
findings upon testing the theory are impressive. 
257 See id. at 199-268 (detailing findings of Stenner’s research). 
258 See discussion of cooperative competition at V.A.2, supra.
259 See id. 
80
equity may reduce the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes by modeling the family as a 
set of relatively reciprocal relationships, open in some measure to renegotiation, in which 
all members have some claim to attention and respect.260 
The argument comes back, then, to women’s substantive freedom and its impact 
on the order of the family – now understood both as a practical arrangement of resources 
and decisionmaking and as the home of normative ideas of human personality and 
relationships.  This time, however, women’s substantive freedom is an instance of a more 
general ideal: reciprocity of respect, power, and affection between sexes and among 
family members more generally.261 Stenner’s argument and evidence suggest, although 
they do not demonstrate, that such reciprocity tends to make the family a schoolhouse of 
non-authoritarian dispositions, a formative object lesson in the belief that order and 
security do not require autocratic authority and abject conformity.  If this is right, then the 
same increases in women’s substantive freedom that counteract demographic crises 
generally may also work through the family to diminish the political appetite for 
reactionary programs that demographic crises otherwise tend to strengthen. 
 It should be clear here that in speaking of relations between the sexes in the 
family, I ultimately refer to relations among persons.  Similarly, in discussing women’s 
substantive freedom, I am discussing a sub-set of the substantive freedom of human 
beings.  The reason to emphasize women’s relative positions is that under present 
circumstances their relative lack of resources and alternatives, and thus of certain 
domains of substantive freedom, feeds into reproductive decisions and, arguably, politics 
in troubling ways.  The more general hope contained in this argument is increases in 
 
260 See id. for a more concrete account of what I mean by this telegraphic account of changes in the family. 
261 See supra n. 222 (on the literature of reciprocity). 
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freedom and reciprocity generally might tend to reduce the paradoxes of individual and 
political freedom.  That, however, is a question for another time.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Whether freedom is sometimes self-undermining is an old question, but not a tired 
one.  Asking it is an important way of ensuring that we do what is necessary to preserve 
essentail freedoms.  In this spirit, I have argued that reproductive autonomy can produce 
social and political consequences that might endanger liberal freedoms.  The argument is 
not an attack on reproductive autonomy, but a reflection on what might be necessary to 
preserve it.262 In different cultural, economic, and political settings, increasing control 
over the number and the sex of children has produced sub-replacement fertility rates and 
a growing sexual disproportion among children and young adults.  Both trends contribute 
to potential political crises: a demographically inflected crisis of the welfare state on the 
one hand, and a potential for growth in authoritarian parties and institutions on the other. 
 The most promising response is not to cut back on reproductive autonomy, but to 
deepen and broaden it by seeking to increase the bases of women’s substantive freedom: 
 
262 Some readers, particularly Neil Siegel, have suggested that the appeal of this article’s argument might be 
entirely independent of the reader’s beliefs about the moral status of abortion: those who favor reproductive 
choice, as I do, should find in the paper an analysis of a potential threat to it and a response that is 
compatible with preserving it; while those who oppose reproductive choice should still be persuaded that 
sex-egalitarian social relations and reconciliation of childbearing and career are attractive ways to mitigate 
serious demographic crises.  While this “overlapping consensus” view of the article is plausible and has 
some appeal to me, I prefer to leave it as a speculative matter rather than insist on who should agree with 
me and why.  My motivations are to address potential threats to three values I hold dear: liberalism, 
democracy, and a vision of sexual equality that includes formal and substantive reproductive autonomy.  
Anyone who shares all or some of these values and is persuaded by my analysis might well join in my 
conclusions.  I suspect, however, that readers who regard abortion as deeply wrong will find the entire 
discussion morally blind, and object to my combination of (1) supposing the normative attractiveness of all 
aspects of reproductive autonomy and (2) treating the results of abortion decisions in a consequentialist 
way rather than concentrating on the inherent moral status of the act.  The argument will thus strike them as 
perverse or incomplete.  To those readers I can only say that this is the character of deep and abiding moral 
disagreement, and that I hope my description and argument nonetheless have some force for them. 
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in developing countries, education and workforce participation; in rich countries, the 
capacity of women and families to reconcile work and childrearing.263 Although best 
paired with other policies, a focus on increasing substantive freedom belongs at the heart 
of a political response to both demographic crises.  Promoting substantive freedom is not 
just normatively attractive from a liberal perspective: it is also the best practical solution 
to the paradoxes of autonomy.  In this case, at least, the answer to freedom’s self-
undermining potential is to become freer still. 
 
263 This is a slightly rhetorical way of putting the matter.  As I note particularly in n. 175, supra, it may not 
be possible to produce a unified metric of “substantive autonomy.”  In any event, that is not a task I have 
attempted here.  A more analytically precise way of putting the matter is that substantive reproductive 
autonomy’s aggregate results are less likely to undermine liberal or democratic values to the extent that 
reproductive autonomy is complemented by substantive freedom in literacy, workforce participation, and 
the capacity to reconcile childbearing with career.  Thus enhancing these dimensions of substantive 
autonomy is likely to be an effective as well as a normatively attractive response to the problems of third-
generation biopolitics.  This autonomy-enhancing response should be taken as a progressive alternative to 
the attacks on reproductive autonomy, formal and substantive, that might accompany the illiberal dangers 
of third-generation biopolitics.  
